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CONFESSING IN THE HUMAN VOICE:  A DEFENSE OF THE PRIVILEGE  
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
by Andrew E. Taslitz* 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Miranda’s Crumbling Foundations 
Miranda v. Arizona1 famously mandates that those subjected to custodial interrogation be 
entitled to counsel during that process and be warned of that right and of their right “to silence.”  
Custodial interrogation can proceed absent compliance with these mandates only if the suspect 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his rights.2 To the surprise of many 
commentators, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Miranda’s constitutional 
status in Dickerson v. United States.3
Yet this supposed civil libertarian victory in Dickerson was a pyrrhic one. The Dickerson 
Court’s reaffirming Miranda rested largely on stare decisis, for Miranda had “become embedded 
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national 
culture.”4 Yet the Court offered no serious defense of Miranda’s inherent wisdom as a 
constitutional rule, indeed arguably expressing some skepticism about that wisdom, or at least 
pointedly steering clear of defending it.  Thus, said the Court, “Whether or not we agree with 
 
*Professor, Howard University School of Law, former Assistant District Attorney , Philadelphia, PA; B.A., Queens 
College, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981. The author thanks his wife, Patricia V. Sun, 
Esquire, and Professors John Conley, Richard Leo, Robert Mosteller, and George Thomas for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this Article.  Appreciation goes as well to the author’s research assistants, Stacy Chaffin, Keri Fiore, 
William Jacobs, and Adrienne Moran. 
1 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
2 See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS, & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 734-37 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining Miranda’s waiver rule). 
3 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 703-07 (analyzing commentators’ pre-and-
post-Dickerson theories concerning Miranda’s viability and meaning). 
4 530 U .S. at 443. 
2Miranda’s reasoning and the resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”5
This failure to offer a reasoned defense of Miranda’s constitutional logic as a matter of 
principle still left a cloud over Miranda’s legitimacy, for the Court simply failed to confront the 
withering and growing criticism of the case. 6 Critics, mostly on the right of the political 
spectrum, have long challenged whether Miranda could be rooted in the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination - - Miranda’s purported constitutional home - - under any 
acceptable theory of “legal” interpretation.7 These critics further questioned whether Miranda’s 
costs, in terms of suppressed confessions and lost convictions of the guilty, justified its marginal 
or non-existent benefits in deterring abusive police interrogations.8 Moreover, maintained critics 
across the political spectrum, there were better ways to regulate police abuses than Miranda, for 
example, by requiring the videotaping of the entire custodial interrogation process, from start to 
finish.9 Other critics, mostly on the left, maintained that Miranda never served as an adequate 
deterrent because police readily obtained “waivers” or otherwise circumvented the Miranda 
rule.10 Likewise, complained this last group of critics, Miranda governed only whether 
 
5 Id. at. 
6 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs:  An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW U.L. REV. 387 (1996) 
[hereinafter Social Costs] (arguing that Miranda results in the acquittal of too many serious felons for little benefit); 
Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW U.L. REV. 1084 (1996) 
[hereinafter Grand Illusion] (responding to critics of Cassell’s position); JOSEPH GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH,
AND THE LAW (1993) (book-length critique of Miranda as lacking a defensible constitutional foundation).  But see 
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 266 (1996) (disputing the claim that 
Miranda has lowered the confession rate); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOL. 621 (1996) (arguing that Miranda has had a profoundly positive impact on professionalizing police 
practices and educating the public about constitutional rights). 
7 See GRANO, supra note 6, at 119-98. 
8 See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 6; Cassell, Grand Illusion, supra note 6.   
9 See, e.g., William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW,
JUSTICE, AND POLICING 303, 303-13 (Richard L. Leo & George Thomas, III, ed.s 1998) (positive view of 
videotaping by the then-Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum); Cassell, Social Costs, supra 
note 6, at 486-89 (arguing for replacing Miranda with videotaping). 
10 See WELSH WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 
76-107 (2001) (summarizing these police tactics). 
3questioning could occur, not how it could be done, opening the door to police tactics risking false 
confessions or violations of human dignity.11 Those tactics, the commentators insisted, could not 
be remedied by other constitutional provisions, for the only other ones relevant, the due process 
clauses, were almost always automatically found met when Miranda was met as well.12 
Whatever protection Miranda did provide, the Court has long been narrowing its scope, 
finding it inapplicable in a wide range of contexts, its waiver easy, “minor” deviations from its 
rule found unworthy of remedy, and suppression of fruits (such as physical evidence or 
witnesses) discovered from its violation unlikely.13 Concerns about whether Miranda continued 
to be seen by the Court as constitutionally-based were further fed by the Court’s repeated 
assertions that Miranda was a mere judicially-created “prophylactic rule,” an “exclusionary 
rule…[that] serves the Fifth Amendment…[but] sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment 
itself.”14 To violate Miranda was thus not to violate true or “core” Fifth Amendment rights.15 
Perhaps because of its lack of confidence that it could articulate a principled justification for 
the Miranda rule, the post-Dickerson Court continued Miranda’s erosion. The Court still 
described Miranda as a mere “prophylactic rule” entitled to less protection than the “core” Fifth 
Amendment privilege16 - - a position hard to give any determinate meaning if, as Dickerson 
concluded, Miranda is a constitutional rule like any other.   
 
11 See id. at 118-59 (analyzing Miranda’s failures). 
12 See id. at 122 (“[R]ecent decisions suggest that when the police comply with Miranda, it is, in fact, very difficult 
for a defendant to establish that the confession following the Miranda waiver was involuntary).  White argued 
persuasively, however, that a more muscular interpretation of due process could do much good.  See Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Book Review, Miranda’s Waning Protections:  Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson, 17 CRIM.
JUST. 57 (2002) (analyzing this aspect of White’s approach). 
13 See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 716-55 (summarizing and analyzing the relevant case law on 
these points). 
14 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1985). 
15 See, e.g., TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 745 (arguing for this reading of the Court’s recent case 
law). 
16 Thus, in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), the Court held that physical evidence obtained as a result of 
a Miranda-violative unwarned confession was nevertheless admissible.  Justice Thomas, writing for a three Justice 
plurality, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, declared that the “core protection afforded by the 
4Additionally the Court has held with force and clarity that physical fruits of Miranda-
violative confessions need not be suppressed;17 that confessions that are the fruits of earlier 
unwarned ones may at best only sometimes be suppressed;18 and that Miranda violations not 
resulting in criminal charges merit no civil damages awards because Miranda and the core Fifth 
Amendment privilege are violated solely by the admission of an unwarned confession at trial 
rather than by questioning made during the interrogation itself.19 The Court now faces further 
pressure to cut back on Miranda in a political climate in which such constitutional rights are 
viewed as unaffordable luxuries that may cost lives in the war on terrorism.20 
B. The “Core” Privilege’s Non-Existent Foundations 
Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial.”  Id. 
at 642 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.).  This core protection “cannot be violated by the introduction of 
nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements.”  Id. Moreover, “a mere failure to give 
Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule” because 
violations of the right and the rule take place only when unwarned statements are admitted at trial.  Furthermore, 
“because police cannot violate the Self-Incrimination Clause by taking unwarned though voluntary statements, an 
exclusionary rule cannot be justified by reference to a deterrent effect on law enforcement” because there is nothing 
to deter.  Id. Although the remaining two justices who supported the Court’s judgment - - Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor - - urged narrower grounds for decision, pointedly choosing not to decide whether there was indeed 
“nothing to deter,” they urged reliance on grounds similar to those in Elstad, thus implicitly accepting that latter 
case’s distinction between “core” Fifth Amendment protections and “prophylactic” ones like Miranda. See Patane,
542 U.S. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
17 See Patane, 542 U.S. 630. 
18 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).  There was no clear majority rationale in Seibert. Although the 
Court ultimately suppressed a second properly Mirandized confession after the police first intentionally obtained an 
earlier un-Mirandized confession, Justice Souter, writing for a four Justice plurality, articulated a multi-factor test 
under which a “question first and warn later” interrogation tactic might be lawful in a particular case.  See id. at 604, 
606, 611-15 (Souter, J., plurality opinion).  One member of the plurality, Justice Breyer, wrote separately to urge a 
“good faith” of the police test.  See id. at 617-18 (Breyer, J.).  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion provided the 
fifth vote, suggesting something closer to per se exclusion of a confession that is the fruit of an intentional effort to 
circumvent Miranda. See id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). All five Justices comprising a majority of votes for 
the case’s outcome thus recognized that under certain circumstances a later confession that is the fruit of an earlier 
unwarned one will not be suppressed.  In a dissent written on behalf of herself and three other Justices, Justice 
O’Connor again embraced Elstad, concluding, therefore, that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree rule never applies to 
Miranda. Accordingly, the dissenters would never suppress a second confession that is the fruit of even an 
intentionally Miranda-violative first confession.  See id. at 622, 622-28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
19 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
20 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS 183-216 (2007) (arguing for legalizing but regulating “coercive interrogation,” involving torture or cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, as necessary in the war on terror). 
5Yet the Court’s ever-reducing zeal for Miranda may be rooted not merely in doubts about 
Miranda’s logic but also in doubts about the wisdom of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination itself, upon which Miranda seemingly shakily rests.21 The Court’s attitude 
arguably is that it is stuck with the privilege because it is, after all, in the Bill of Rights, but there 
is no reason to magnify that regrettable error by giving the privilege an unduly broad meaning.22 
Still less is there reason to keep vibrant a “prophylactic rule” like Miranda, a hole-riddled fence 
meant to safeguard a decaying, archaic constitutional property.23 To be sure, the Court does 
praise the privilege in grandiloquent but ultimately empty phrases, applauding its opposition to 
the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt;24 its role in promoting a sense of 
fair play, a fair individual-state balance,25 and an “accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of 
 
21 See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 696-703 (discussing Miranda’s roots in the Fifth Amendment 
privilege). 
22 See id. at 716-55 (summarizing the Court’s frequently state-protective interpretation of Miranda), 801-48 
(summarizing the Court’s frequently state-protective interpretation of the “core” Fifth Amendment privilege).  
Justice Scalia, in a 1990 case, albeit then in dissent, may have captured the Court’s implicit reasons for its frequent 
reluctance to give the privilege a backbone: 
 
[I]t is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard an honest 
confession as a mistake. While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for 
the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves.  Not only for 
society, but for the wrongdoer himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently 
desirable because it advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation….We should, then, 
rejoice at the “poor fool” who has made [an honest confession]; and we should regret the 
attempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek to facilitate and encourage it.  To design 
our laws on premises contrary to these is to abandon belief in either personal responsibility or 
the moral claim of just government to obedience, 
 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Note that I have said that the Court 
“frequently,” not always, sides with the state on privilege issues.  There are important exceptions, most notably, 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27 (2000), which made it difficult for prosecutors seeking to subpoena records 
from a suspect to do so without first granting him use and derivative sue immunity against the act of producing the 
documents or their contents being used against him at trial.  See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and 
Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 
(2002) (analyzing thoroughly Hubbell’s implications for subpoena practice); Sara Sun Beale and James Felman, The 
Fifth Amendment and the Grand Jury, 22 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5-6 5-6 (2007) (analyzing implications of Hubbell and its 
progeny). 
23 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16. 
24 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
25 Id. 
6criminal justice”;26 and its protection of the innocent and “respect for the human personality and 
of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life….”27 These 
noble-sounding phrases appear less often in the Court’s most recent privilege jurisprudence.28 
1. Hiibel’s Halted Hopes 
Indeed, the Court has in several recent instances given the core privilege short shrift 
in the face of sometimes minimally countervailing state need.  For example, in Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Nevada,29 an officer responding to a tip asked a man on the scene for 
identification.  After the officer eleven times requested that man, later identified as Larry Dudley 
Hiibel, to identify himself, the officer threatened to arrest Hiibel if he still refused to answer.  
When Hiibel did so refuse, the officer arrested him for obstructing a public officer’s discharge of 
his duties. The officer relied on a statute requiring persons detained by an officer on reasonable 
suspicion of crime to identify themselves.  The Court affirmed Hiibel’s later conviction, 
describing the required revelation of his name as “so insignificant in the scheme of things as to 
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances”30 and deriding Hiibel’s refusal to answer as 
done simply “because he thought his name was none of the officer’s business.”31 
Justice Stevens dissented.  First, he concluded that Hiibel’s revelation of his name was 
“testimonial,” for a “testimonial communication” is “the extortion of information from the 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 24 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 (2004) (“Although discussion of abstract values can still be found occasionally 
in its opinions, the Supreme Court has shifted to a formal approach to the Fifth Amendment.”); Lance Cole, The 
Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Documents After United States v. Hubbell - - New Protection for 
Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 142-43 (2002) (concluding that, in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 
396-97 (1976), the Court “rejected both property rights and personal privacy as rationales for protection against self-
incrimination; instead, it looked to the text of the Fifth Amendment and focused on the compulsion of ‘testimonial’ 
communications as the touchstone for self-incrimination analysis.”).   
29 542 U .S. 177 (2004). 
30 Id. at 191. 
31 Id. 
7accused, the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind.’”32 The direct 
questioning by the officer pursuant to threats of arrest, argued Stevens, was also compulsion.33 
Nor would Justice Stevens accept the majority’s core argument that Hiibel’s compelled 
disclosure of his name would not have been “incriminating,” for, in Stevens’ view, one’s name 
can readily provide the necessary link to inculpatory evidence: 
 The Court reasons that we should not assume that the disclosure of 
petitioner’s name would be used to incriminate him or that it would furnish a 
link in a chain of evidence needed to prosecute him….But why else would an 
officer ask for it?  And why else would the Nevada Legislature require its 
disclosure only when circumstances “reasonably indicate that the person has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime?”  If the Court is 
correct, then petitioner’s refusal to cooperate did not impede the police 
investigation.  Indeed, if we accept the predicate for the Court’s holding, the 
statute requires nothing more than a useless invasion of privacy.  I think that, 
on the contrary, the Nevada Legislature intended to provide its police officers 
with a useful law enforcement tool, and that the very existence of the statute 
demonstrates the value of the information it demands…. 
 
A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the 
person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of 
law enforcement databases.  And that information, in turn, can be 
tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution.  It is therefore quite wrong to 
suggest that a person’s identity provides a link in the chain to incriminating 
evidence “only in unusual circumstances.”34 
Remember that Hiibel had been stopped because the officer claimed, based upon a tip, to 
have “reasonable suspicion” that Hiibel was involved in a crime.  Under Terry v. Ohio,35 the 
Fourth Amendment permits such reasonable suspicion stops, so long as they are brief, relatively 
unintrusive, and involve an effort to question a suspect to confirm or dispel the officer’s 
suspicion, questions that Justice White, in his Terry concurrence, importantly said, the suspect 
 
32 Id. at 191, 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)). 
33 See id. at 194-95. 
34 Id. at 195-96. 
35 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8was “not obliged to answer….”36 Justice Breyer,37 joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in 
dissent in Hiibel, insisted that this final quoted language from White’s concurrence in Terry was 
part of what made a brief stop so unintrusive that it would be justified on mere reasonable 
suspicion rather than probable cause.  Indeed, in Breyer’s view, this understanding of Terry was 
longstanding, having been restated in Berkemer v. McCarty,38 where the full Court declared that 
“an officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his 
identity and try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.  But the 
detainee is not obliged to respond.”39 Even more recently, noted Breyer, the Court in Illinois v. 
Wardlow40 had explained that allowing officers to stop and question a fleeing person is “quite 
consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in 
the face of police questioning.”41 The majority’s cavalier denial of Fifth Amendment protections 
to Hiibel, therefore, argued Breyer, had grave Fourth Amendment implications, constituting a 
sub silentio overruling of Terry to permit far more invasive police investigatory actions:  
 There is no good reason to reject this generation-old statement of the law.  
There are sound reasons rooted in Fifth Amendment considerations for 
adhering to the Fourth Amendment legal condition circumscribing police 
authority to stop an individual against his will….Administrative 
considerations also militate against change.  Can a state, in addition to 
requiring a stopped individual to answer “What’s your name?” also require an 
answer to “What’s your license number?” or “Where do you live?” Can a 
police officer, who must know how to make a Terry stop, keep track of the 
constitutional answers?  After all, answers to any of these questions may, or 
may not, incriminate, depending upon the circumstances. 
 
Indeed, as the majority points out, a name itself—even if it is not “Killer 
Bill” or “Rough ‘em up Harry”—will sometimes provide the police with a 
“link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate 
 
36 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
37 542 U.S. at 197, 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
38 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
39 Id. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
40 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
41 Id. at 125. 
9offense.”…The majority reserves judgment about whether compulsion is 
permissible in such instances…. How then is a police officer in the midst of a 
Terry stop to distinguish between the majority’s ordinary case and this special 
case where the majority reserves judgment?42 
More was, therefore, at stake in Hiibel than might at first blush seem to be involved in the 
simple request for a name.  Indeed, some commentators have worried that Hiibel opens the door 
to a mandatory national electronic identification card containing an array of identifying 
information that would have to be produced for the police upon demand.43 
2. Lile’s Difficult Choice 
42 542 U.S. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For a detailed analysis of Hiibel’s erosion of Terry, see E. Martin 
Estrada, Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the Terry Doctrine, 40 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. (2005). 
43 See, e.g., Arnold Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop:  The Saga of Dudley Hiibel, 9/11, and the Vanishing Fourth 
Amendment, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 929, 939, 941 (2005) (expressing the fear that Hiibel portends mandatory 
national identity cards readily to be produced for police inspection upon request); M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called 
Hiibel: The Criminalization of Silence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 357, 393 (2004) (expressing similar concerns); 
TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 342-43 (querying how much identifying information might be 
permissible on a national identity card in light of Hiibel).  It is worth noting that Dudley Hiibel had in fact 
committed no crime other than his refusal to identify himself to the officer; that the officer refused to respond to 
Hiibel’s inquiries about why the officer wanted Hiibel’s name and identification papers; and that the officers, who 
were supposedly investigating a report of a woman being beaten, ended up throwing the only woman present, 
Hiibel’s daughter, Mimi, to the ground when she protested, then arresting her.  See Loewy, supra, at 930-36, 943-45.  
Here is what Hiibel himself had to say about the Supreme Court’s decision in his case: 
 
I don’t have a super-clear understanding of the Constitution.  I’m not an attorney.  I’ve never 
even read the whole thing.  I only went through eighth grade. But I remember what I learned, 
and it seems to me that the whole idea of “your-papers-please” goes completely against the 
grain of the American people. 
 
As I understood it, the state was supposed to serve us - - not that we were supposed to serve 
the state.  Laws were supposed to protect the people against the government, not the other 
way around. 
 
Maybe in Los Angeles and other places across the country, the police have browbeaten the 
people into more acceptance of this police state mentality than where I am.  I live out on a 
ranch, the nearest town is 30 miles away, and it only has 7,000 or 8,000 people.  I think that 
has an effect on our mentality. 
 
It’s not that I’m anti-law enforcement.  Criminals should be apprehended.  But I don’t think 
we’ve got to take everybody’s rights away just so that we can be safe.   If you do that, you’ve 
defeated your purpose.  I don’t think people want to be protected to the extent that they 
become slaves. 
 
I’m very disappointed by this decision.  I think a basic freedom has been lost.  What bothers 
me the most is that my children and grandchildren are going to have to live with this law.  It 
moves us a step closer to control of the people by the government, and I don’t think that’s a 
step forward.   
See id. at 945. 
10
McKune v. Lile44 offers a second illustration of the Court’s often grudging attitude 
toward the privilege.  There, prison officials, several years before convicted sex offender Robert 
Lile was scheduled to be released, ordered him to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment 
Program (SATP). The program required participating inmates to sign a form discussing and 
accepting responsibility for the crime for which they were sentenced and to complete a sexual 
history that was to extend even to activities constituting uncharged criminal offenses.  These 
forms had to be signed and completed without either contractual or court-ordered immunity from 
prosecution.  Prison officials told Lile that if he refused to participate, his privileged status would 
be reduced, curtailing his visitation rights, earnings, and work opportunities, and he would be 
transferred from a two-person to a four-person cell and in a likely more dangerous maximum 
security unit.  He refused to participate, citing the privilege, and brought suit for injunctive relief.  
When the case ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, it reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in Lile’s favor.  The Court plurality, in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the 
program was not an elaborate ruse to circumvent the privilege, nor was compulsion even present. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the plurality stressed the “serious threat” sexual offenders posed to 
the nation, their high recidivisim rate, their need for clinical rehabilitative programs to manage 
their impulses, and the importance to program success of their accepting responsibility for all 
their actions.  On the other side, the plurality characterized the threatened penalties Lile would 
face for not confessing his sins as not “atypical and significant hardships,” a test the plurality 
borrowed from its due process jurisprudence.45 Incarceration “necessarily place[s] limitations on 
 
44 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
45 Id. at 37. 
11
the exercise of a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.46 Lost work and television 
opportunities were small prices to pay given that “rehabilitation is a legitimate penological 
interest that must be weighed against the exercise of an inmate’s liberty.”47 Because acceptance 
of responsibility via this program bore a “rational relation” to a legitimate rehabilitative 
objective,48 indeed served an important social purpose, said the plurality, it “would be bitter 
medicine to treat as irrelevant the State’s legitimate interests and to invalidate the SATP on the 
ground that it incidentally burdens an inmate’s right to remain silent.”49 Given the “de minimis” 
harms to Lile, the threatened penalties did not “rise to the level of unconstitutional 
compulsion.”50 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, rejecting the “atypical hardship” test for a more 
commonsense test “whether the pressure imposed in such [a] situation rises to a level where it is 
likely to compel a person to be a witness against himself.”51 But, even under her alternative test, 
Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality that Lile’s threatened loss of privileges and transfer to 
maximum security did not constitute compulsion. 
 Interestingly, the Court made little fuss about the cost to Lile of facing additional criminal 
prosecutions based on supposedly therapeutic incriminating statements.  Justice Stevens 
dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, partly because of this point.  Not only 
did the majority undervalue this risk, but it also ignored the “dignitary and reputational” harms 
from the threatened transfer, the stigma of a punishment equal to that provided for the most 
serious offenses against prison rules (theft, drug abuse, and assault), the deprivation of privileges 
 
46 Id. at 38. 
47 Id. at 36. 
48 Id. at 37-38. 
49 Id. at 41-42. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 48, 49 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
12
earned by years of good behavior, and the unreality of ignoring downward changes in baseline 
prison conditions as likely being experienced by Lile as forms of serious punishment.52 Said 
Stevens,  
Based on an ad hoc appraisal of the benefits of obtaining confessions from sex 
offenders, balanced against the costs of honoring a bedrock constitutional 
right, the plurality holds that it is permissible to punish the assertion of the 
privilege with what it views as modest sanctions, provided that those sanctions 
are not given a “punitive” label.  As I shall explain, the sanctions are in fact 
severe, but even if that were not so, the plurality’s policy judgment does not 
justify the evisceration of a constitutional right.  Despite the plurality’s 
meandering attempt to justify its unprecedented departure from a rule of law 
that has been settled since the days of John Marshall, I respectfully dissent.53 
Stevens further chided the majority for using the wrong rod to measure compulsion.  “The 
coerciveness of the penalty in this case,” insisted Stevens, “must be measured not by comparing 
the quality of life in a prison environment with that in a free society, but rather by the contrast 
between the favored and disfavored classes of prisoners.”54 None of the Court’s prior opinions, 
Stevens concluded, “contains any suggestion that compulsion should have a different meaning in 
the prison context.”55 
It is not my purpose here to attack or defend the holdings in Hiibel and McKune nor indeed in 
any other of the Court’s Fifth Amendment privilege cases.  Rather, Hiibel and McKune illustrate 
the Court’s ready willingness implicitly or explicitly to engage in a balancing of state against 
individual interests in giving the privilege meaning.  I have no quarrel with balancing, indeed 
seeing it as unavoidable in the context of the privilege. Where I do have a quarrel with the Court, 
including with the dissenters in Hiibel and McKune, is the Justice’s failure to articulate with any 
specificity exactly what values the privilege serves.  Vague, high-sounding praise for a checklist 
 
52 Id. at 54, 60-68 (Steven, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 54-55. 
54 Id. at 67. 
55 Id. at 58. 
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of disparate but ambiguous justifications for the privilege give lower courts and the police little 
guidance for future cases and leave even the Justices no common ground on which to contend 
with difficult or novel issues. Still worse, absent a convincing justification for the privilege, the 
individual may too readily lose in the weighing process, leading to the privilege’s slow erosion.  
Alternatively, even where the individual deserves to lose, the absence of a persuasive 
justification is inconsistent with procedural justice.56 
C. An Alternative to the Scholarly Assault on the Privilege 
The Court’s failures adequately to justify the privilege occur in an intellectual climate in 
which many commentators’ biting critiques of any proffered justifications for the “right to 
silence” are widely seen as persuasive.57 Sophisticated philosophical efforts to shore up the 
 
56 Procedural justice, provision of which can increase obedience to the law, includes receiving an understandable 
explanation for the government’s action that even the loser in the courtroom can accept as legitimate.  See, e.g., TOM 
R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE 
COURTS 80 (2002) (noting that procedural justice is enhanced when authorities are perceived as being candid and 
complete in explaining their reasons for action).   
57 See infra text accompanying notes 59-60. This observation does not mean, however, that there are not well-
respected supporters of the philosophical foundations for the right to silence. There are.  See, e.g., SUSAN EASTON,
THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 133-97 (2d ed. 1998) (responding to arguments that the privilege against 
self-incrimination primarily protects the guilty and undermines the truth-finding functions of a trial); Sheri Lynn-
Johnson, Confessions, Criminals, and Community, 26 HARV. CIV. RTS. – CIV. LIB. L. REV. 327 (1991) (defending 
the privilege as one among several “voluntariness rights” that prevent sacrificing the individual in the name of 
community); R. Kent Greenawalt, The Right to Silence and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 192 (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent ed.s 1992) (justifying the 
privilege as protecting human dignity, defined as the absence of humiliating treatment). But each of these supporters 
offers some variant on a variety of standard justifications for that privilege that Akhil Amar, among other leading 
critics, has systematically assailed.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 65-70 
(1997). Here is a quick summary of Amar’s critiques: 
 
1. Compelled Self-Accusation is Cruel: Nonsense, says Amar, because we routinely and 
necessarily compel such accusation where it has sometimes devastating civil consequences.  
Id. at 65. 
 
2. The Privilege Protects Mental Privacy: Wrong again, says Amar, because we routinely 
require witness-revelation of embarrassing, even humiliating, information in civil cases, like 
divorce, involving high emotional intensity.  Id. at 65-66. 
 
3. Government Disrespects a Person by Using Him as an Instrument of His Own 
Destruction: No it doesn’t, insists Amar, because “generally, the law is entitled to every 
person’s evidence,” no matter how harmful to him, so long as he does not thereby face 
criminal prosecution.  Id. at 66-67. 
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privilege’s intellectual foundations — including on grounds other than those articulated by the 
Court - - are reflexively-derided by many leading authorities as well-meaning but misguided.58 
Thus Harvard criminal procedure theorist William Stuntz has explained, “It is probably fair to 
say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the privilege against self-
incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”59 Well-known 
 
4. The Privilege Furthers a “Fair Balance” Between the State and Individuals and 
Expresses a Preference for an “Accusatorial Over an Inquisitorial System”:  “These phrases, 
however, are more like slogans that simply restate the rule than carefully considered 
rationales.”  Id. at 67.  They devolve into just making the game interesting by handicapping 
the state and do not explain why it is perfectly acceptable to compel a suspect to produce 
physical evidence. Amar offers a similar response to the argument that the privilege forces the 
government to “shoulder its entire burden of proof.”  Id. at 67. 
 
5. The Privilege Helps to Deter Improper Police Practices: Not so, says Amar, for those 
practices remain rampant. 
 
6. The Privilege Protects the Innocent: No, it does not, Amar points out, because it prevents 
the innocent from compelling the guilty to testify.  Id. at 68. 
 
7. The Privilege Promotes Reliable Evidence: A good goal, agrees Amar, but not one he 
sees the current version of the privilege protecting well, partly because it is sometimes applied 
to exclude quite reliable evidence.  Id. at 68. 
 
In summary, concludes Amar:   
 
None of the rationales typically given for the self-incrimination clause can satisfactorily 
explain the current scope of the privilege and its relation to the rest of our legal and moral 
system. Sometimes, the idea behind the given rationale is simply wrongheaded.  At other 
times, the animating idea is valuable but proves too much or too little (or both) and thus 
cannot explain why the clause goes as far as it now does but no further. 
Id. at 65. 
58 The best-known comprehensive critique of the varied proffered justifications for the privilege is David Dolinko, Is 
There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1986).  More recent 
efforts to supplement the Court’s stated justifications for the privilege have been described by two leading 
commentators as “a proliferation of scholarly emendations to the Court’s explanations that uniformly fail to 
convince.”  Allen & Mace, supra note 28, at 245.  See also Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the 
Criminal Justice System, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1015-23 (1996) (cataloguing reasons for the 
unconvincing nature of these efforts). 
59 William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988).  These critiques of the 
justifications for the privilege extend to both the defenses offered by scholars and by the Court.  See Allen & Mac, 
supra note 28, at 244 (describing the “fundamental values” that the Court lists as protected by the privilege as 
“striking in their vacuity and circularity”), 245 (assailing scholarly defenses of the privilege). Even seeming friends 
of the privilege have found much of its scope troubling and many of its defenses inconsistent.  See, e.g., Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 311, 311 (1991) 
(“The Self-Incrimination Clause is probably our most schizophrenic amendment.”).  Important critiques of the 
privilege and its justifications were made by leading figures in the mid-twentieth century, see Henry J. Friendly, The 
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:  The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968), and go at least as 
far back as Jeremy Bentham.  See EASTON, supra note 57, at 163-97. 
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constitutional scholar Akhil Amar similarly concludes thus:  “Small wonder, then, that the self-
incrimination clause - - virtually alone among the provisions of the Bill of Rights - - has been the 
target of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth century from thoughtful 
commentators urging constitutional amendments to narrow it or repeal it altogether.”60 
In this article, I have no intention of taking on the daunting task of responding to each, or 
even any, of the critiques of the privilege or the cheers of its defenders.  Instead, I plan to recite a 
theory of my own.  My “new” defense does draw on elements of some older ones61 but places 
 
60 AMAR, supra note 57, at 68. Amar claims to be a friend of the privilege, offering what he sees as the first 
persuasive justification for it:  to protect against the compulsion of the spoken word by a witness at a criminal trial.  
Id. at 46-47, 70-71.  But this justification would, as Amar happily admits, allow the government to compel testimony 
in “grand jury rooms, legislative hearings, civil cases, criminal cases in which someone is on trial, and depositions 
organized by prosecutors,” even depositions of the criminal defendant himself, albeit then under the supervision of a 
presiding judge.  Id. at 70.  Furthermore, although Amar would bar introduction of compelled pre-trial testimony at 
the speaker’s own criminal trial absent his knowing and intelligent consent, Amar would readily allow into evidence 
the fruits of compulsion, including physical evidence and documents stemming from compulsion, such as by a 
subpoena.  See id. at 70-71, 76, 84.  Moreover, the overriding justification for Amar’s approach is this:  “The self-
incrimination clause, as best read, is designed to protect a truly innocent defendant who might be made to look 
guilty on the stand by a clever prosecutor skilled in technical courtroom procedure and forensics.”  Id. at 74.  
Whatever the wisdom of Amar’s proposal as a matter of policy or even of constitutional interpretation, it is hardly a 
defense of anything that looks remotely like the current privilege. 
61 For example, I ground my argument in part in a theory of “mental privacy,” albeit one tightly linked to the role of 
language in human social interaction, an approach different from that of other writers.  See supra note 57 and 
accompanying text (summarizing others’ privacy theories).  My idea of the role of compulsion under the privilege 
resonates with the work of other authors embracing protection of human dignity by avoiding state-imposed 
humiliation as a justification for the privilege, see Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 193-98, but, unlike those authors, 
my concern with humiliation is linked tightly to the importance of words in self-definition.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 62-77 (summarizing the major components of my theory of the privilege).  Amar too focuses 
on words but emphasizes their cognitive, rather than their social, component, embracing the truth-promoting 
function of the privilege and radically constricting its coverage in ways I do not.  See supra note 58 (summarizing 
Amar’s argument). Allen and Mace deny that they are “justifying” the privilege at all, claiming they are merely 
describing theory inherent in the doctrine, a theory that, though quite different from Amar’s, again stresses 
narrowly-defined cognitive processes over social, linguistic ones.  See Allen & Mac, supra note 28, at 247-48.  
Louis Michael Seidman, in a brilliant forthcoming book, praises the right to silence as essential to human expressive 
freedom.  “A defiant silence,” his book cover explains, “demonstrates determination, courage, and will,” as when 
draft resisters refuse to take a military oath, their silence serving as a “manifestation of connection, commitment, 
and meaning.”  See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM (forthcoming 2007).  Seidman also sees the 
privilege as “preserving the distinction between mind and body on which human freedom depends.”  Id. Seidman’s 
emphases on political expression, individual identity, and social isolation versus social solidarity hit chords 
harmonious with my own ideas about voice and privacy. But Seidman does not root his analysis in the social science 
concerning language use, social stigma, and the nature of the human personality, as I do, nor does my theory turn so 
much on the separation of body and mind as their linkage; the physical acts of speaking and writing, I argue, help to 
constitute and alter the more intangible parts of our nature.  Finally, Janet Ainsworth has explored the impact of 
“powerless language,” but she limited her exploration to the narrow context of the interrogation room; did not place 
her analysis into a broader theory of privacy; did not focus on the many other linguistic forces at work beyond the 
powerlessness dynamic; and did not explore the nature and role of linguistic compulsion as central to the very 
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them into a broader overriding theme, adds never-before articulated aspects, and examines 
inadequately-explored implications.  My hope is to start a dialogue that will either foster my 
embryonic theory’s growth toward adulthood or quickly kill it as a monstrosity that I could not 
initially see. 
 1. The Literal Voice 
Concisely (and perhaps therefore misleadingly) stated, my theory is this: the privilege 
against self-incrimination serves to protect the literal and metaphorical voice of those ensnared in 
the criminal process. By “literal voice,” I mean the physical qualities of the human voice - -its 
pitch, tone, rate, and timbre - - and the content of its aural message, the precise words chosen and 
their likely perceived meaning.62 The literal voice plays important social functions in addition to 
conveying denotative information, including enabling social judgments to be made about a 
speaker’s moral culpability and social status, his credibility, and his inclusion or exclusion from 
full membership in society.  Audience reactions to the literal voice also help to reinforce social 
norms, igniting pressures to move social dissenters toward complying with, and indeed 
emotionally embracing, those norms.  These social processes mean that the mere expression of 
the literal voice may subject a speaker to intense social stigma, to moral assessments of his 
character and culpability based upon distorted or incomplete information, and to 
misunderstandings of his intended message, even when, for example, in the interrogation 
context, he truthfully confesses his guilt.63 These forces can prove still more disturbing, of 
course, for the innocent speaker.   
 
definition of the privilege.  See Janet Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259 (1992). 
62 See infra Part III. 
63 See id. 
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But it is not only protection from having one’s words used by others to mis-define64 the 
speaker’s essential nature that the privilege protects, for the compulsion of such words itself 
forces the speaker to change his very nature without his choosing. The speaking of words has the 
power to shape thoughts, feelings, and character, as recent cognitive science research reveals. 
Such compulsion is deeply and uniquely humiliating in ways not previously recognized.65 
The criminal justice system is appropriately designed in part to provide the ultimate state 
expression of social norms and social stigma, rendering confessions in that context sui generis.66 
The right “to silence” and its corollaries enable a suspect, or even a witness, to minimize the ill 
social effects of compelled speaking in that context, including minimizing distortion of the 
speaker’s message - - costs that he would otherwise bear to some degree even if he is ultimately 
neither convicted nor even prosecuted.67 
In sum, one powerful justification for the privilege, therefore, is this:  it guards against the 
compelled articulation of words that raise a risk of both undue state intervention in the very 
 
64 Professor Lawrence Lessig describes a privacy theory focusing on mis-definition as solving a portion of the 
problem of limited attention span.  See Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L. J. 2063 (2001).  In 
other words, the problem is that observers will not take the time fully to gather all the available information about a 
person and process it thoroughly so as to correctly understand it.  See id. at 2064-72. But Lessig’s description is an 
incomplete one, at least of the mis-definition theory offered in this article, First, the privacy theory argued for here 
turns on the importance of having control over self-revelation. To lose such control is to lose command over 
choosing just what sort of person you are or wish to be, for, as Part IV of this article will explain, compelled self-
revelation in fact changes your fundamental nature in ways you might not prefer, a grievous moral injury.  Second, 
control matters because you may not want to reveal all of yourself to all others in all contexts, and they may not 
want you to do so. What you do care about is revealing those aspects of your character in a particular setting in such 
a way so that those aspects will be fully understood.  Thus, on the job, you might want to reveal information about 
your punctuality and self-discipline but not your love life. Indeed, fuller revelation of more aspects of your self is a 
mark of intimacy, both identifying and helping to create close personal relationships.  If you lose control over self-
revelation, therefore, you lose control over your intimate life. Third, it is impossible to reveal sufficient information 
about yourself to most individuals to enable them to judge your entire nature fairly, even if they bothered to pay 
adequate attention, for full self-revelation takes years and is a continuing process as we ourselves change over time.  
If we lose control over self-revelation, therefore, we necessarily risk mis-definition of our overall being. Fourth, the 
act of being described itself changes our nature, so we may prefer to avoid self-revelation even if others’ 
assessments of us are accurate.  Last, the self-revelation theory here is concerned with the importance of words in a 
way that neither Lessig nor others has addressed. The theory here thus incorporates, but is about more than, attention 
span. 
65 See infra Part IV. 
66 See infra text accompanying notes 212-41. 
67 Id. 
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creation of the speaker’s essential nature and the resulting extreme social stigma and social mis-
definition of personality that result from the prospect of being judged by the criminal Justice 
system.  Rephrased, the privilege protects against the compelled articulation of the literal voice 
in, or for use at, a criminal trial. Furthermore, although the spoken voice is the paradigm case, 
similar values are involved in protecting the compelled written word.68 This theory’s emphasis 
on feared social stigma at self-revelation does put it in the privacy camp of defenses of the 
privilege.  However, it differs from other privacy theories by focusing on compelled words,
language as not only opening a door to one’s head and heart but as helping to construct them 
both.69 Furthermore, unlike other privacy theories, it emphasizes the unique danger of private 
thoughts and feelings being exposed to a particular audience: the criminal justice system.70 
Moreover, this theory emphasizes the cognitive, emotional, and societal harms stemming from 
compelled linguistic self-revelation.  Unlike other privacy theories, therefore, mine does not 
suffer from the problem of overbreadth - - of explaining too much.71 Other constitutional 
provisions protect other aspects of privacy, and many sometimes overlap with the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection.72 But only the Fifth Amendment privilege guards against the specific 
sort of privacy invasion involved in compelled language.  Moreover, because under this theory 
the full-scale harms of language compulsion occur whenever the compulsion takes place with the 
prospect of criminal justice involvement, the privilege retains its broad scope as operating both 
before and during the criminal trial.73 
2. The Metaphorical Voice 
68 See infra text accompany notes 403-63. 
69 See supra note 61 (describing others’ privacy theories). 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See infra text accompany notes 466-69. 
73 See supra note 60 (describing Amar’s theory, which, by contrast, limits the role of the privilege to the criminal 
trial of the defendant seeking to assert the privilege). 
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Note, however, that I have said that defense of the literal voice is one purpose of the 
privilege, and my focus in this article will solely be on that subject.  But a fuller defense of the 
privilege also requires exploring the importance of protecting the metaphorical voice. The 
metaphorical voice is the expression of social information by a speaker’s words to a political 
body, such as a judge or jury, carrying data relevant to the development of political norms and 
processes, even though conveying such data may not have been the speaker’s intention.74 That 
voice, it turns out, requires the presence of counsel.  Without a right to counsel, the privilege is 
nearly useless, for an accused who chooses to remain silent has no voice with which to defend 
himself.  He must speak or simply put himself at the court’s mercy.75 Moreover, the political 
message that he conveys can only be effectively presented with the aid of counsel or by 
counsel’s speaking in the defendant’s stead, that is, as if it were the defendant himself 
speaking.76 The political nature of even a run-of-the mill trial and the political role of trial 
counsel are not self-evident.  Without understanding them, therefore, my defense of the 
privilege, both in its “core” form and as it manifests itself in Miranda, is incomplete.  Explaining 
the role of the literal voice is the only task I seek to complete here.   
 One final caveat.  My goal here is to offer a sound justification for the privilege.  I am not 
arguing that my defense of the privilege is in some sense dictated by the constitutional text or its 
history.  Nor will I have much to say about specific doctrinal puzzles. But offering a 
philosophical defense can be a first step in constitutional interpretation and can overcome the 
 
74 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Miranda and Metaphor: The Role of Counsel in the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
(unpublished draft manuscript 2007) [hereinafter Miranda and Metaphor]. 
75 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1449, 1477-79 
(2005) (making similar point). 
76 See Taslitz, Miranda and Metaphor, supra note 74. 
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institutional ennui that stems from wrongly viewing the privilege as an unfortunate relic of a 
more primitive age.77 
After this Part I Introduction, Part II of this article briefly summarizes the sort of “mental 
privacy” that the privilege protects.  Part II also explores a two-stage theory of privacy harm and 
the unique role of the criminal justice system.  Part III analyzes the social science literature on 
the impact of the literal voice on a speaker’s audience, next extending that argument to 
handwriting, typing, e-mail, blogs, and chat rooms.  Part IV completes the model by examining 
the harms done to the human personality from compelled speech.  Finally, Part V, the 
conclusion, sums up the preceding arguments and briefly explores some potential implications.   
II. Mental Privacy 
A. Privacy and Mindreading 
 In common sense terms, “mental privacy” means having control over when, how, and to 
whom each of us reveals our thoughts and feelings in our own words.78 Two key aspects of this 
definition are that we retain control over the revelation decision and that the revelation is 
conveyed by our own words.79 Other people are constantly trying, and frequently succeeding, in 
 
77 SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79-116 
(2007) (explaining why even originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation ultimately require resolving a 
number of philosophical questions). 
78 Thomas Carlyle put the point this way: 
A man always is to be himself the judge how much of his mind he will show to other men, 
even to those he would have work along with him. There are impertinent inquires made: your 
rule is, to leave the inquirer uninformed on that matter, not, if you can help it, misinformed; 
but precisely as dark as he was! 
THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY (1841) (quoted in LEONARD ROY 
FRANK, QUOTIONARY 742 (2001)). 
79 See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER, THE CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 35-38, 
93-102, 138-41 (2005) (summarizing research demonstrating that the quest for control over our environment, 
including our social environment, is a basic human need and that our power ever language use is our central means 
for exercising social control); BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: FOLK EXPLANATIONS,
MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 68-71 (2004) (explaining that the human drive for meaning requires using 
language to construct private, internal explanations of your own and others’ actions and public, communicative 
explanations to manage social impressions); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
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gaining access to our minds and hearts by reading our facial expressions, body language, and 
tone of voice.80 They do so in light of social conventions and of any particularized information 
about us that they have obtained from other sources.81 These efforts to read our minds against 
our will may be resented, yet they do not violate mental privacy as I have defined it here because 
we are not compelled to condemn ourselves in our own words.82 Indeed, it would be impossible 
to stop such efforts at mindreading, for it is an evolutionarily-developed skill necessary to all 
human social interaction,83 as I will illustrate shortly.   
 Successful mindreading enables us to build or fend off close personal relationships, to 
modify our own behavior in personally beneficial ways, and to predict or influence the behavior 
 
PRIVACY, INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY 38 (2006) (noting that “[a] number of theorists…conceive of privacy as 
a form of control over personal information,” a broader definition than the linguistic mental privacy, involving 
control over language use, that I defend here as central to understanding the right to silence).   
80 See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 6 (defining mindreading, also known as theory of mind, as the ability to 
“anticipate the thought processes and emotional processes of others,” making us simultaneously “more sensitive to 
what others might be thinking about us,” matters “vital to enable us to participate in complex social 
interactions….”); MALLE, supra note 79, at 70-71, 155-65 (noting and illustrating primacy of language in 
impression management); Paul EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE 
COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE 219-20 (2003) (explaining that, while persons vary in their ability 
accurately to read emotions from voice and face, most people can do so, at least if the expressions are intense and 
the person observed is not trying to hide the emotion).   
81 Explains MALLE:
Knowledge, however, is not the only cognitive resource available.  If an explainer does 
not actually know the agent’s reasons, he may still infer or construct them.  Indications in the 
agent’s mannerisms or past behavior, clues from the action context, and general cultural 
expectations about the kinds of motives that underlie certain behaviors usually provide a 
sufficient basis for inducing a reason. 
MALLE, supra note 79, at 123.  Malle is defining “reasons” in a technical sense as only one sort of explanation we 
construct for human action, but elaborating here on those details would do little to add or subtract from my point. 
82 Yet that resentment can sometimes be quite powerful. Says Jean Rolin, “The pretension of man to explore the 
conscience of others, the forcible rape of secrecy, are a diabolical parody of the all-seeingness of God.”  FRANK,
supra note 78, at 743 (quoting JEAN ROLIN, POLICE DRUGS 7.2 (transl. Laurence J. Bendit 1956)). 
83 See, e.g., BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 209 (“If you are going to be competent to participate in human culture, 
you have to be able to think in terms of social causes.”); DAVID LIVINGSTON SMITH, WHY WE LIE: THE 
EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF DECEPTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND (2004) (describing the “evolutionary arms 
race” between detection and deception, that is, between being able to read minds versus blinding others to your 
own); ERIC HOFFER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HUMAN CONDITION 142 (1973) (“There are no chaste minds.  Minds 
copulate wherever they meet.”). 
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of others.84 This tool is, of course, an imperfect one, because evolution has also developed 
deceptive strategies designed to shield our true hearts from others.85 Individuals vary in their 
skill at performing deception, and its use varies with context.86 Moreover, the person whom we 
seek to read may not know his own mind.87 Self-deception runs rampant through the human 
community.88 Nevertheless, imperfect though it may be, mindreading efforts are central to the 
human condition,89 and each of us knows and expects at some level that we are constantly being 
 
84 See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 92-93, 97-97 (explaining that understanding of others and self furthers the 
human quest for control over the social sphere by enabling you to predict what others will do, influence them, build 
or alter relationships with them, and change  yourself to fit the social environment); MALLE, supra note 79, at 71 
(your private explanations of your own and others’ actions help to satisfy your own curiosity, allay confusion, and 
predict or manipulate social reality, while your publicly-stated explanations of your own actions satisfy others’ 
curiosity, lessen their confusion, manage their impressions, manipulate their behavior, combat disagreements, and 
coordinate joint plans or actions). 
85 See SMITH, supra note 83, at 65-71.  Self-deception about our real motivations is one critical tool for hiding them 
from others:  
Why did self-deception take root in the human mind?  As we will see, the propensity for self-
deception probably became part of our nature because it was so helpful to us in our dealings 
with one another.  Not only does lying to oneself soothe many of the stresses of life, but, more 
importantly, it also helps one lie to others.  One of the most important insights of modern 
sociobiology is that self-deception is the handmaiden of deceit: in hiding the truth from 
ourselves, we are able to hide it more fully from others. 
Id. at 3. 
86 See id. at 104-11 (noting that it is hard for many people to lie effectively, to remain straight-faced while playing 
“social poker”).   
87 See SMITH, supra note 83, at 50-78, 106-11 (explaining the evolutionary forces promoting widespread self-
deception among the human species). 
88 See id.: STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 42-75 (analyzing 
cognitive strategies involved in self-deception); see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape 
and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381 (2005) (summarizing in detail the cognitive and evolutionary 
psychology literature on self-deception). 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.  Cognitive and evolutionary psychologist David Livingstone Smith put 
this point well: 
The effective deceiver must be able to track others’ responses on a moment-to-moment basis, 
adjusting his or her tactics based on a steady stream of perceptual feedback.  An artful, 
wheeling-dealing species must have a knack for predicting, controlling, and understanding 
behavior.  In order to do so, it must have an intuitive grasp of how to infer others’ mental 
states and how these mental states work together to produce behavior. For this reason, we 
spend a good deal of our time trying to figure out the mental states of others - - their beliefs, 
desires, goals, and fears - - so as to manipulate their behavior in ways that serve our own 
interests. 
Id. at 105-06.  Smith continues:  “A savvy social operator needs to have an excellent grasp of human self-interests, 
because it’s impossible to beguile others unless you understand what makes them tick.”  Id. 
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so scrutinized and are doing the same to others.90 What we can usually protect are the words in 
our hearts and minds or that we use to describe what else resides there.91 Words too can 
deceive,92 but humans give them especially powerful weight as a window into another’s soul.93 
Some windows are seen as clear, others purposely smudged and thus requiring a more careful 
look and a bit of clearing away the dirt obscuring what lies beneath.94 Yet they are both 
windows just the same. 
 Not all thoughts and feelings, of course, consist of words. Yet the only way each of us has to 
understand or convey the wordless feeling or fledgling thought is in words.95 Most thought is 
indeed subconscious,96 yet when we can bring such thoughts to the conscious surface, or at least 
when we believe we can do so, it is only by words that these thoughts become accessible.97 
90 See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 6 (“The ability to see ourselves as others see us, and to care about what they 
think, is a crucial part of what makes us human - - and it is also utterly unavoidable, indispensable, if you are going 
to live in culture”). 
91 Although it sometimes seems that several mental speakers are competing for our attention, we 
each know that the “voices” in our heads - - the various questioners and answerers who 
participate in our inner conversations - - are actually part of us. Despite the sense that there 
are different voices in your head, you know that the decision that you ultimately make 
whether to go on a cruise or to have tea or to take the job in Seattle is your decision.  You 
don’t have the sense that one of the voices in your head has somehow won the day and that 
the others have unhappily sulked away in silence.  Your ability to self-reflect allows you to 
realize that you are, in fact, the source of all these disparate thoughts. 
MARK R. LEARY, THE CURSE OF THE SELF: SELF-AWARENESS, EGOTISM, AND THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE 29 
(2004). 
92 See SMITH, supra note 83, at 110. Smith elaborates: 
 Language ushered in a new phase in the timeless struggle between the forces of deception 
and detection.  Loading the dice heavily in favor of the former, it enabled human beings to 
misrepresent reality much more effectively than had previously been possible. The sword of 
language cuts two ways:  it is both enlightening and bewitching, an instrument for 
understanding and a snare for the unwary. 
Id. 
93 See infra Part III (illustrating the many ways humans judge others and make weighty decisions about them based 
on their voice). 
94 See infra text accompanying notes 260-64(on relatively clear versus relatively ambiguous language signals and 
how we use them to judge others). 
95 See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Science Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 
15-18, 24 (1998) [hereinafter Feminist Approach]. 
96 See Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 392. 
97 See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 95, at 24. 
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Words, all words, necessarily require interpretation,98 and different interpreters will assign the 
same words different meanings.99 Even the originator of a thought faces interpretive problems.  
If your heart beats fast and your palms sweat, are you experiencing fear, anticipation, or loss?  
Often you will be uncertain, struggling to decide. When you do, you will assign a label based on 
your prior life experience, social context, and a wide array of other factors.100 
Yet why should we care so deeply about having control over self-revelation?  One important 
answer, I will argue, lies in understanding the nature and causes of individual uniqueness versus 
similarity and the social functions of each. 
 B. The Individual as Sui Generis 
Pulitzer prize finalist, Judith Rich Harris, synthesizing the recent work being done on the 
human mind by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists, has articulated a 
persuasive explanation of why each individual is indeed in many ways unique while also sharing 
so much in common with many others.101 To be sure, Harris recognizes the impact of the usual 
suspects of individual heredity and the environment in explaining human variation.102 But she 
also finds other powerful individual and social mechanisms at work by which each of us tries to 
be like others in some ways, different from them in others.  These mechanisms are rooted in 
three systems or “modules” in the brain:  the socialization, relationship, and status modules.103 
1. The Socialization Module 
98 See id. at 18-21. 
99 See id. at 25-26. 
100 See id. at 20-23. 
101 See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY (2006) 
(book-length defense of this explanation). 
102 See id. at 24-26, 40-41. 
103 See id. at 106-62. 
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The socialization module or system works to make each of us more like those in our 
group.104 “Groupness” is an important concept for humans.  Humans have a strong need to 
belong to a group, finding pleasure in solidarity and acceptance.105 Indeed, most of us consider 
ourselves members of an array of groups, and part of our sense of uniqueness comes from the 
particular intersection of our multiple group identities, for example, as a young Jewish 
Northeastern heterosexual Democrat or a mature Christian Southern gay Republican.106 Group 
membership brings not only its own psychic rewards but also the greater power and resources 
stemming from cooperative group, relative to mere individual, action.107 Group membership can 
also protect us from other groups hostile to our own.108 Indeed, groups struggle to distinguish 
themselves from one another, and, sadly, positive group identity often turns on defining members 
of other groups negatively, as outsiders.109 So powerful are these forces of categorization that, in 
famous experiments, the mere labeling of groups led to violence between them, as when two 
groups of eleven-year-old boys at Robbers Cave summer camp went to war110 and college 
 
104 See id. at 206. 
105 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 134-35 (1999); BAUMEISTER, supra 
note 79, at 107, 377 (discussing importance of group-belongingness); DAVID BERREBY, US AND THEM:
UNDERSTANDING YOUR TRIBAL MIND 16 (2005) (noting that group affiliation is “an absolute requirement for being 
human”). 
106 See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 97, at 23 (“[O]ur social identity - - our sense of who we are and what 
we are worth - - is intimately bound up with our group memberships.”); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 
105, at 135 (“Although all individuals are unique, some part of how we express ourselves draws on group self-
concepts….”). 
107 See BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 107-09 (noting that belongingness promotes happiness, mental and physical 
health, and that “[g]roups can share resources, care for sick members, scare off predators, fight together against 
enemies, divide tasks so as to improve efficiency, and contribute to survival in many others ways.”). 
108 See id. at 378 (“People may have evolved to recognize the presence of an enemy group and to seek to form bonds 
and alliances for their own protection.”). 
109 See id. at 377-78 (making this point); BERREBY, supra note 105 (extended treatment of the dangers of “the tribal 
mind.”). 
110 See M. SHERIF, ET. AL., INTERGROUP COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 
(1961) (providing details of this experiment in which separation into groups led each of them to fistfights, theft, 
property destruction, and preparation for retaliatory raids aimed at the opposing group). 
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students labeled “guards” in a mock prison quickly began the brutal humiliation of those students 
labeled “prisoners.”111 
The socialization system teaches us the rules for being like others in our group. 112 Each of us 
observes the behavior of others in our group as we grow up, forming prototypes of appropriate 
behavior for group members by computing averages of the behaviors observed.113 This learning 
process includes understanding the social categories important to the group, thus necessarily 
involving acceptance of stereotypes about outsider groups’ members.114 These sterotypes are at 
their most powerful when we deal with strangers.115 Moreover, the in-group prototypes are not 
necessarily perfect averages of observed group behavior but may be skewed toward the behavior 
of the highest status members of the group.116 
Group memberships’ hallmarks and changes in them are solidified by gossip.117 Membership 
concepts and behavior are thus marked and evolve by “anti-memes,” ideas spreading like viruses 
via language, the “anti” portion including ideas that “we” (the in-group) share but that “they” 
(the out-group) do not.118 In this way, groups often grow to be unique, or at least so to perceive 
themselves, working to distinguish their ways from others.119 Among the ways that groups mark 
 
111 See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007) 
(recounting the horrifying details of this “Stanford Prison Experiment” and its broader implications for real-world 
group conflict and the resulting corruption of individual members). 
112 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 193-95. 
113 See id. at 194-95. 
114 See id. at 192-93. 
115 See id.  
116 See id. at 195 (“Higher-status members of a group - - those who rank higher in the attention structure - - are 
looked at more, which means they have more opportunity to contribute data. The effect would be to shift the 
prototype in the direction of the higher-status members.”). 
117 See id. at 193 (making this point); Robin Dunbar, The Social Brain Hypothesis, 6 Evolutionary Anthropology 
178, 178-90 (1998) (recounting empirical data supporting this point).  For an extended analysis of the role of gossip 
in individual and group life, see ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE (1996). 
118 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape (and Other) 
Cases, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 145 182-83 (2007), (analyzing the “meme” and “anti-meme” concepts); HARRIS,
supra note 101, at 157, 196 (discussing role of anti-memes in them/us thinking). 
119 See BERREBY, supra note 105, at 149 (“Human kinds are also guides to action. Once I’ve classed myself and the 
stranger as, say, employee and boss, I know which game to play and which rules apply - - how to speak, how to 
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their membership is via language differences, differences that in extreme situations can mark one 
as worthy of life or of death.120 The Bible recounts one such story: 
And the Gileadites took the passage of Jordan before the Ephraimites: and 
it was so, that when those Ephraimites which were escaped and said, Let 
me go over, that the men of Giliad said to him, Art thou an Ephraimite?  If 
he said, Nay, Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth; and he said 
Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right.  Then they took 
him, and slew him at the passage of Jordan: and there fell at that time of 
the Ephraimites forty and two thousand. 121 
As Harris herself analyzed the Shibboleth story, “Forty and two thousand might have been an 
exaggeration, but however many there were of them, they died because they spoke with the 
wrong accent.”122 
2. The Relationship System 
 Like the socialization system, the relationship system likely had important 
evolutionary advantages but of an almost opposite kind.123 Even without belonging to a group 
with many shared understandings and behaviors, there are important differences among 
individuals.124 The relationship system allows us first, to identify one individual as distinct from 
others, second, to understand in as much depth as possible what makes that person unique.125 
Physical qualities, such as facial appearance or the sound of a voice, may serve the first goal.126 
But the second goal turns in part on our effectiveness as mindreaders.127 That effectiveness is 
 
dress, and how to behave toward this other person”), 170-71 (describing experiment in which the creation of two 
groups led the members of each group to develop distinct social norms, including linguistic ones, in order more 
clearly to mark their group as “us” and the opposing one as “them”). 
120 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 157, 161. 
121 HOLY BIBLE, Judges 12: 5-6. 
122 HARRIS, supra note 101, at 161. 
123 See id. at 164-65. 
124 See id. at 8-9 (explaining that, although we exaggerate the consistency in other people’s behavior, individual 
differences - - character traits - - are real and have evolutionary advantages). 
125 See id. at 169-20, 173. 
126 See id. at 170. 
127 See id. at 174-75; supra text accompanying notes 78-90 (analyzing the nature of mindreading and its evolutionary 
advantages, including allowing us to predict others’ behavior); BERREBY supra note 105, at 123-25 (describing 
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critical to our social and material success, perhaps even to our survival.128 Thus the relationship 
system’s  
function is to furnish answers to evolutionarily important questions like 
these:  Will this person help me if I am in need?  Does this person repay 
favors? Can this person be relied upon to be a fair partner in trade?  Is 
this person a close relative?  Would this person have sex with me?  
Would this person be a good long-term mate?  Can this person beat me 
up?  Does this person like me?129 
The relationship system is thus “a discriminator, not a generalizer - - a splitter, not a lumper.”130 
It serves “to make fine distinction among individuals,”131 importantly including distinctions 
giving hints about the relative dominance and submissiveness of those interacting and of their 
relative status in the group, judgments that, when made accurately, can help to resolve conflict or 
even to avoid it in the first place.132 So important are these fine distinctions that we seek to make 
them even when we have limited information, relying on generalizations, if need be.133 But we 
recognize the importance of maximizing our information about another individual, especially 
given the difficulty of mindreading and of that individual’s incentives to deceive.134 Yet again, 
gossip is a critical source of such information, gossip necessarily requiring naming practices so 
 
importance of gathering information about particular individuals over time to improve our ability to mind-read 
them). 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 78-92 (on the necessity of mind-reading for individual survival and 
flourishing). 
129 HARRIS, supra note 101, at 165. 
130 Id. at 181. 
131 Id. 
132 See id. (“Obligations must be repaid, duplicity remembered, compatible companions sought out, obnoxious ones 
avoided, those with higher status deferred to.”). 
133 See id. at 182 (noting that, even after a brief encounter with another individual, we will use “whatever we have so 
far learned about that person” to make working models of their character, generalizing from even a small sample of 
their behavior to make our “best guess” that “this individual will behave in the future the way he or she behaved in 
the past.”). 
134 See id. at 164, 171-81 (noting the importance to the relationship system of gathering maximum information about 
individuals and illustrating how each of us goes about that task); supra text accompanying notes 78-90 
(summarizing processes for, and significance of, mindreading and deception). 
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that the participants can clearly identify the subject of that conversation’s gossip.135 Gossip also 
helps us to update our knowledge of another with whom we have not of late had much contact 
because recent information is better than its stale cousins.136 
3. The Status System 
Although each of us wants to be accepted by our group, emphasizing our 
similarity or equality to others members, we also want to be better than those others, or at least 
to know where we stand in the status hierarchy and how we might move up it or identify those 
beneath us.137 Higher status is its own reward, but it also brings easier access to more 
community resources.138 Culture can reduce status abuse and even the relative importance that 
we assign to status versus equality, but humans are driven to make status judgments, and the 
status system enables them to do so.139 
Status inheres by definition in how most members of the community view you or would view 
you if they knew you.140 Accordingly, judging our own status requires a special sort of 
mindreading - - reading what status another assigns to us and why.141 Status is multidimensional 
and varies with context. 142 A lousy athlete has low status on a baseball team.  Yet if the same 
person writes unusually well, he may have high status as a journalist.143 Knowing what status we 
 
135 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 173-74 (making similar point); BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 139-40 
(explaining the importance of gossip as a way of learning about and predicting the behavior of specific individuals). 
136 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 18-20, 173-74.   
137 See id. at 209 (“To compete with one’s groupmates is to strive for status”); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra 
note 105, at 134-35 (explaining that different groups have different social status, so the status of the individual is 
inescapably also linked to the status of his group). 
138 See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 105, at 112. 
139 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 211-13 (‘making this point’); cf. ROBERT W. FULLER, ALL RISE: SOMEBODIES,
NOBODIES, AND THE POLITICS OF DIGNITY (2006) (arguing that proper institutional design can reduce “rank abuse,” 
though not the existence of rank or status themselves) [hereinafter ALL RISE]. 
140 See ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY vii-viii (2004) (arguing that our status or position in society matters so 
much to us “because our self-conception is so dependent upon what others make of us.”). 
141 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 224-26. 
142 See id. at 212. 
143 These examples are mine but make the same point as similar examples offered by other commentators. See id. at 
226; ROBERT W. FULLER, SOMEBODIES AND NOBODIES: OVERCOMING THE ABUSE OF RANK 15 (2003) (“But, unlike 
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are assigned in what setting thus not only tells us how to behave toward others but also how to 
move up the status hierarchy, whether in that context or in another one.144 It is for this reason 
that the status and relationship systems interact in an important way that contributes to the 
development of human uniqueness.145 
The process works thus. Someone observing us is driven by his relationship system to use his 
mindreading skills and what he has learned about us from others to make judgments about our 
unique qualities.  His status mechanism will draw on these judgments to assign us a relative 
status.146 But we, the observed, are in turn motivated by our status system to learn what status 
judgments the observer has made about us and why.147 What any one observer thinks about us 
does not give us status. Rather, we must mindread many such observers, computing an average 
or “generalized other’s” conception of our status and where and why we were assigned it.148 
Whether or not others’ assessments of us are accurate, they will make assessments that assign us 
some unique or unusual combination of status-altering traits.  Our assessment of that assignment 
leads us to modify our behavior.149 
For example, if we are perceived as physically weak but admired for our kindness, we might 
more often choose settings where kindness is valued and work to emphasize what is kind about 
our behavior.  To be sure, we also could choose to go to a gym to bulk up, but our short stature 
and delicate frame may make it hard for us to get much mileage out of this strategy, and it is, in 
 
a chicken coop, modern human societies comprise thousands of different hierarchies, and a person at the bottom of 
one may be at the top of another. The worst bowler on the company team may be the CEO; the college dropout may 
be a billionaire.”). 
144 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 239. 
145 See id. at 225. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 221, 224-25: GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A
SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 138 (1934) (first coining the term “generalized other”); Gary A. Fine, Friends, Impression 
Management, and Preadolescent Behavior, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN’S FRIENDSHIPS 29, 31 (S.R. Asher 
and J. M. Bottman ed.s 1981) (more recent use of Mead’s idea but using the term “other”). 
149 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 225, 227. 
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any event, easier for us to build on what we already see as our strengths.  (On another trait, such 
as being a poor dresser, we might have more ability to change, provided we have the money and 
a good source of sartorial advice).150 Our kind behavior reinforces our self-image as kind, even 
at the subconscious level, as do the rewards we receive in praise and self-satisfaction. 151 
Repeated observations of our kindness lead to gossip about the trait, further improving our status 
on that score in settings where it is valued.152 In addition to our actions, an important source of 
whether others see us as kind is the words we use and whether they are perceived as sincere.153 
Perceptions of our kind nature can also open doors to us where skilled kindness is needed that 
might otherwise be closed.154 Our efforts to stand out on a trait, such as kindness, the social 
science research suggests, tend to take root as longer-lasting aspects of our character if they 
persist through about age 16.155 In this way are the best nurses and schoolteachers borne.  
Persons who find status in physical strength and aggression, on the other hand, might become the 
Sumo wrestlers and other athletes of the future. 
 
150 Once again, the examples are mine, though they are inspired by others’ work in this field. See id. at 239 (noting 
that the status system gathers social information that it uses “to plot a long-term strategy that will involve direct 
competition only in those areas of endeavor in which the individual has a hope of succeeding….”). 
151 See Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 438 (explaining how consistently repeated behavior changes how 
we think and feel, even down to the unconscious level). 
152 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 231-32 (gossip can affect your status in a way that persists for many years, 
though Harris’s example was of negative gossip); BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 286 (noting gossip promotes social 
learning and alters status and behavior by providing a means for both social rewards and punishments). 
153 Cf. DAVID CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS: WHY BABIES BABBLE, WORDS CHANGE MEANING, AND 
LANGUAGES LIVE OR DIE 278 (2005) (noting that for some speech acts, “[C]ertain sincerity conditions also have to 
be present: the speech act must be performed in a sincere manner.  Verbs such as apologize, guarantee, and vow are 
effective only if speakers mean what they say; believe and affirm are valid only if the speakers are not lying) 
(emphases in original); DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF
THE NATION 306 (2007) (“There is nothing more compelling in politics than a candidate who is genuine.”). 
154 Cf. KIERON O’HARA, TRUST: FROM SOCRATES TO SPIN 14 (2004) (“What does trust buy you?  It gets you out of a 
state of uncertainty….[I]f someone has promised to help you, and you trust her, then you can plan on that basis.”); 
PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE (2004) (noting that 
humans have evolved “through selection for what is sometimes called ‘reciprocity,’ namely, an instinctive 
inclination to do unto others as they have already done unto you.  If others have treated you well, you treat them 
well in return, but if they have hurt you, you hurt them back. An eye for an eye certainly, but also a gift for a gift.”). 
155 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 218-19. 
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Apart from the benefits to the individual, this process of differentiation brings society the 
benefits of diversity and specialization.156 Famed Scottish philosopher Adam Smith long ago 
insightfully recognized the social advantages of this process in the economic realm, though its 
advantages extend to all other social realms as well.  Explained Smith: 
 The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much 
less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to 
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is 
not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division 
of labor. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a 
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so 
much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came 
into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they 
were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play fellows 
could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, 
they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of 
talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees.157 
This process, of course, takes place for many different personality traits and aspects of our 
lives. The combination of qualities we each develop, through the interaction of the socialization, 
relationship, and status systems, combined with genetic tendencies, current environment, life 
experience, multiple group memberships, and happenstance make us uniquely who we are. 158 
That part of our uniqueness that stems from the combined effects of the socialization, 
relationship, and status systems turns in significant respects on the words we use, including what 
we say about ourselves to ourselves and to others and how we and they respectively interpret and 
react to those words. 159 Our control over self-revelation and our efforts to pierce others’ control 
over their own revelation importantly shape our very sense of who we are, how we fit into the 
broader social world, and what we become.  Fully understanding this point requires 
 
156 See id. at 238-40. 
157 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 1, ch. 2, part 3 
(1776) (reprinted Metheun & Co. 1904). 
158 See HARRIS, supra note 101, at 238-40, 247. 
159 See id. at 255-58. 
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understanding attribution theory160 in more detail, that is, the ways in which each of us and our 
collectivities judge the worth of others’ thoughts, actions, and nature. 
 C. When We Are Judged 
Humans by nature seek meaning, a sense of interconnection among observed events, 
thoughts, and behaviors that make sense of our world.161 Part of meaning-making involves 
privately crafting explanations of our own perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and actions to 
ourselves.162 As noted previously, because such explanations occur by a form of internal 
conversation - - thinking with words - - and all words are chosen by and require interpretation, 
our efforts to explain ourselves to ourselves are necessarily interpretive.163 We seek these 
private explanations to satisfy our curiosity about ourselves, allay confusion about what we do 
and why, and improve our ability to control ourselves and thus to manipulate reality.164 Much 
self-deception can be involved in this process, however, sometimes to our advantage, sometimes 
to our disadvantage.165 But the process itself is inevitable.166 
Correspondingly, we all seek, for analogous reasons, to develop our own internal 
explanations of others’ behavior via the process of mindreading alluded to earlier.167 Part of 
mindreading involves, however, making evaluative judgments about others, including assigning 
blame to them for their thoughts, feelings, or actions.168 Yet each of us knows that others are 
 
160 See JENNY MCEWAN, THE VERDICT OF THE COURT: PASSING JUDGMENT IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 10-11, 44 
(2003) (defining attribution theory). 
161 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 64 (defining meaning); BAUMEISTER, supra note 79, at 88 (“Most animals want to 
feel pleasure and avoid pain.  In human beings, as cultural animals, that same motivation is present, but it has been 
transformed into the search for happiness.  Happiness depends on meaning.”). 
162 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 65-69, 71. 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 96-100; Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 97, at 15-18, 24. 
164 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 68-71. 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 844-94; Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 394-98. 
166 See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 33 (1990) (“[T]he central concept of a human psychology is meaning 
and the processes and transactions involved in the construction of meanings.”). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 79-94. 
168 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 68 (“Explanations aim at identifying the factors that generated the behavior, such 
as reasons, emotions, specific situational factors, or traits”); MCEWAN, supra note 160, at 10-15, 26 (describing 
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also making similar culpability judgments about us.169 We also know that, even in everyday 
situations, such judgments have short and long-term consequences, including informal sanctions 
like snubbing, ignoring, ridiculing, or chastising the offender,170 creating a mechanism of social 
norm enforcement,171 what has been called a privately-enforced system of “law in brief 
encounters.”172 
Partly to avoid these sanctions, and partly to obtain other positive benefits, such as improving 
our social standing or manipulating others’ behavior, we are constantly generating public 
explanations for our behavior too.173 These public explanations can also serve to satisfy others’ 
 
psychological mechanisms by which we assign responsibility and blame); Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two 
Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS. WOM’S L.J. 3 (2000) (describing the process by which we 
separately assign blame, first, for having certain emotions, second, for acting on them). 
169 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 19-20 (2000) 
(describing individuals’ fear of misjudgment by the “unwanted gaze” of the crowd); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself 
Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 107 (1980) (observers 
readily make judgments about our entire nature based on little evidence, much of it taken out of context, or by 
allowing their perception of one of our traits to taint their overall perception of our entire nature). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 82-94 (describing these social consequences); ROSEN, supra note 169, at 21 
(describing emotional consequences). 
171 See generally SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (Eric A. Posner ed. 2007) (collecting 
essays defining social norms, informal methods for their enforcement, and their connection to law); NICOLE DUBOIS,
A SOCIOCOGNITIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL NORMS (2002) (extended analysis of the social-psychological processes 
of norm creation and enforcement). 
172 See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 21-24, 42-43 (1999) (describing social sanctions for 
violating informal social rules, such as those governing the when, how, why, and how long of human staring and 
glaring). Reisman emphasizes the too often overlooked importance of recognizing how “micronorms” - - those 
governing the smallest of social interactions - - serve as a legal system in themselves and play a role in more formal 
legal rules, in the definition of the self, and in finding a life of meaning: 
 Micronorms and their sanctions may be significant factors in the shaping of personalities 
in ways that have civic impact and social importance, not to speak of effects on an 
individual’s autonomy, self-assurance, sense of self-worth, and capacity to develop affection 
for others. Knowledge of micronorms and facility in their use can empower.  Most generally, 
microlegal systems and how we use them may influence our ability to be happy.  Microlegal 
systems, like international law, may be near “the vanishing point of jurisprudence,” but their 
low visibility and hitherto disdainful recognition by scholars of the law should not obscure the 
effects they can have on social order, the quality of individual lives, and the formation of 
personalities. 
Id. at 15. 
173 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 68-72, 74-75. 
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curiosity, or lessen their confusion, about us or can promote the mutual understanding necessary 
to coordinating joint plans and actions.174 Social psychologist Bertram Malle put the point thus: 
Explanations have to be formulated in language to effectively change an 
audience’s impressions, move their emotions, or direct their actions.  
Clarifying one’s goals, excusing one’s actions, or presenting someone else’s 
motives as virtuous all require communicating one’s explanation to an 
audience.  The social-interactive functions that are served by communicative 
explanations constitute…[a] major motivation for behavior explanations.175 
Relative social status plays an important role in determining the frequency and contact of the 
behavior explanations a person offers. Those “lower in the power hierarchy will be inclined to 
preemptively offer behavior explanations but not expect the same from those above them.”176 
The explanations offered can include whether an action was intentional or not, the reasons (the 
contributing beliefs and desires) for undertaking it,177 the causal history or background factors 
that led to the rise of the reasons, and those factors that enabled the intention to be translated into 
action.178 The degree of intentionality can vary - - for example, from negligence, to recklessness, 
to knowledge, to purpose - - with more intentional acts seen as more blameworthy than less 
intentional ones.179 The existence of a perceived duty to act in the face of a preventable harm 
also increases blame-assessment.180 
On the other hand, the more that a person’s reasons for action are attributed to her causal 
history, “such as in her upbringing, personality, culture, or in the immediate context,” the less 
 
174 See id. at 70-71. 
175 Id. at 70.  
176 Id. at 75. 
177 See id. at 78-79, 220. 
178 See id. at 86-87. 
179 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD.
L. REV. 1, 14-17 (1993). 
180 See id. at 15-16; MALLE, supra note 79, at 89.  
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that her actions are viewed as truly chosen by her, thus the less culpable she appears.181 
Personality assessments can cut both ways, moreover, for the more that a condemnable action 
seems to stem from a fundamental character trait definitional of the actor’s nature, the more 
disapproving a moral assessment his actions might also be given.182 
So strong is the need to assess the moral quality of another’s actions in light of her reasons, 
personal history, and context that observers lacking adequate information, especially about an 
actor’s mental state, will infer it or construct it.183 If person-specific mental state information is 
so scanty that it cannot be constructed, observers will search for general information about the 
actor’s history and context and, if that quest fails, will postulate generic explanations - - “reasons 
for why anybody might act that way.”184 
Moreover, these same processes operate in connection with groups that are seen as jointly 
acting, that is, as consisting of members who deliberate and act together as a unified agent. 185 
Indeed, the behavior of such groups is even more likely to be attributed to group intentionality 
and reason-choosing - - that is, to the group’s character and freely-made choices - - compared to 
the less culpable factors of its background and history than is true for individuals.186 Perceptions 
of group unity can come from cognitive biases and from propaganda,187 and the actions of 
individual members of stereotyped groups may partly be assessed in light of those stereotypes.188 
181 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 91, 107. 
182 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 179, at 110-13; MCEWAN, supra note 160, at 13 (defining the “fundamental 
attribution error,” the tendency of observers in many circumstances unduly to attribute the observed’s behavior to 
fundamental character traits rather than the situation; however, the more the observer knows about the circumstances 
facing the actor, particularly those affecting his ability to do otherwise, the more the effect of the fundamental 
attribution error may be mitigated). 
183 See MALLE, supra note 79, at 123. 
184 See id. at 124. 
185 See id. at 200 
186 See id. at 206-07. 
187 See id. at 209. 
188 See id. at 213. 
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Add into the mix the facts that observers are often willing to make sweeping judgments about 
actors’ character based upon limited information; that such observers allow their perception of 
one bad character trait to infect their overall assessment of the actor’s moral worthiness; and that 
actors and observers often interpret the same behavior differently, and it becomes clear that each 
of us faces the constant danger of suffering social sanctions upon being morally judged by others 
with whom we interact.189 Those sanctions can be severe, even involving material deprivation 
(e.g., by being fired from a job), when those others have more power and social status than we 
do.190 These fears are terrifying when realized, even if we think that our judges have gotten the 
facts right.  But the emotional pain is still more severe when we believe that they have gotten it 
wrong, misreading our intentions, character, and personal history or evaluating aspects of them 
out of context.191 
Apart from the righteous anger at being unfairly sanctioned for misjudgments, such 
misjudgments are inherently painful even if little in the way of concrete penalties results.  
Remember that each of us is driven to see ourselves as unique.  This self-perception of 
uniqueness is central to self-definition.192 Being misjudged as being different from whom we (in 
our lights) truly are is thus experienced as an assault on our personhood, an attack on our soul.193 
Remember too that our unique self-identity arises in significant part from how we believe others 
see us.194 After a certain age, core parts of our self-identity become more resistant to, but likely 
not impossible to, change.195 Others’ assessment of our nature is thus always important to us, 
 
189 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human 
Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.S 125, 154 (2002) [hereinafter Human Emotions] (making these points in the 
context of analyzing the nature of Fourth Amendment privacy). 
190 See id. at 155. 
191 See id. at 154-58.  
192 See supra text accompany notes 101-60. 
193 See Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note 189, at 155. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 137-59. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 155-56. 
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always to some extent continuing to affect our character’s evolution, while social 
misunderstandings of who we are feel like rejection of a lifetime of self-shaping and seem to 
reflect an ignorance of the experiences and situational constraints from which we benefited or 
suffered.196 
Yet the risk of being mis-defined is enormous, for the self is a multiple rather than a unitary 
concept - - we each have many sides.197 We may reveal selected aspects of ourselves in certain 
contexts where we want to be judged by that portion of our character, such as when we convey 
an image of professional competence, control, and reliability on the job.198 Yet to truly be 
known for all of our many sides requires much time and experience and must occur slowly lest 
we be misjudged, a part of our nature being taken for the whole.199 Accordingly, trust and 
commitment are required for two people to know each other well, so we reserve relatively 
unbridled self-revelation for intimate others. That self-revelation indeed becomes a marker of 
intimacy.200 As Professor Jeffrey Rosen explains: 
True knowledge of another person…requires the gradual setting aside of 
social masks, the incremental building of trust, which leads to the 
exchange of personal disclosure.  It cannot be rushed….True knowledge 
of another person, in all his or her complexity, can be achieved only with a 
handful of friends, lovers, or family members.  In order to flourish, the 
intimate relationships on which true knowledge of another person depends 
need space as well as time: sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in 
which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible.201 
196 See Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note 189, at 155-57. 
197 See id. at 153-54. 
198 See id. at 153-55. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 153-54. 
201 ROSEN, supra note 169, at 8. 
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Others’ assessments of our desires, beliefs, and actions in even a single instance will have 
some impact on their assessment of our overall character.202 Strong empirical and moral 
arguments have indeed been mounted that our culpability assessments about another person are 
and should be made based upon the extent to which a single bad action is seen as reflective of a 
bad character.203 Yet being mis-defined, including by judging all of who we are based upon a 
single perceived bad choice, causes us humiliation, indignity, and mental distress.204 There are, 
Jeffrey Rosen again explains, “few experiences more harrowing than being described: [T]o be 
described is to be narrowed and simplified and judged out of context.”205 Consequently, “there 
are few acts more aggressive than describing someone else.”206 
Now we can see what mental privacy is and why we hold it so dear.  It is not so much 
necessarily the content of any particular thought or feeling that we fear revealing as the risk that 
it will be misunderstood or taken out of context and, especially, that we lose control over when, 
how, and to whom it is revealed.207 That control helps us to avoid mis-definition; to maintain 
our sense of being a unique, bounded personality, separate from the herd; and to manage our 
social status and interpersonal relationships.208 Moreover, extensive revelations of many sorts 
 
202 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra, note 179, at 107; see generally LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON 
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207 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786, 787-89 (1971) (Harlan J., dissenting) (noting that privacy 
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are generally reserved for our most intimate others.209 Forced revelations to those outside this 
small circle of friends and family can feel like forced intimacy with those for whom such a 
relationship is neither desired nor intended.210 It is through language that we primarily express to 
others our private thoughts and feelings. The sense of forced speech about ourselves and our 
actions to strangers is, therefore, experienced as an invasion of the person and a betrayal of our 
sacred relationships with our truly intimate others, degrading our social status and our sense of 
equal worth.211 
D. Criminal Justice 
The ultimate culpability assessor is the criminal justice system. 212 The material 
consequences of blame by that system are, of course, potentially far more severe than is the case 
for more informal social systems:  imprisonment or even death.213 Future job consequences are 
diminished, and imprisonment especially can result in marriages killed, other family ties 
strained, children abandoned, friends lost.214 Apart from these consequences, the fact of 
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conviction, especially in modern American society, marks the convicted as an outsider to the 
political community, a lesser being in fact if not formally so in law.215 
Moreover, the condemnation represented by a conviction is far more extensive than, and of a 
different nature from, that stemming from lesser wrongs.  It is one thing to be blamed by one’s 
spouse, children, or friends, or even by one’s church or neighborhood, for letting them down.  It 
is another thing entirely to also be blamed by the entire political community, yet that is just what 
a criminal conviction represents.216 
In practice, those subjected to the criminal law are also most often members of despised 
groups or individuals otherwise already weak in social status and power.217 They also have the 
fewest resources for painting what they see as an accurate picture of their essential nature and of 
their life circumstances for them to be fairly judged by the courts.218 
The public condemnation involved in a criminal conviction also helps to shape social 
influences and social meanings, in turn affecting the meanings that individuals give to their own 
and others’ actions.219 The law also sends signals that “can shape the emotions of the citizenry,” 
for “[p]eople have some choice in forcing themselves to consider another person’s point of view 
 
215 See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 212, at 356 (“The exclusion of the offender from being a full member of the 
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217 MICHAEL K. BROWN, ET AL., WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 132-60 (2003) 
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or in directing their attention to other issues.”220 Whether the law treats spousal killing in 
revenge for adultery lightly or harshly affects public perceptions about the acceptability of 
certain emotions and of acting upon those emotions.221 But assessments of emotions and 
resulting actions are closely linked to our overall assessment of another’s character.222 As two 
leading social psychology specialists on culpability assessment put it, “[T]he law delivers a 
message about what is acceptable, understandable, forgivable, or not. The law is part of the 
system of cultural norms that influences how to behave, and therefore it is, in principle, 
impossible to consider the effects of emotion on behavior as if they were independent of the 
Law.”223 
Unfortunately, the categories of the law do not always make room for the complexity of 
human experience.224 For example, conflicting social norms can tear at an accused in a way that 
cries out for mitigation.225 Yet the rules of law may not easily accommodate this reality.  A 
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defense lawyer can, however, help to present an accused’s story in a way that fits into the pre-
existing legal categories, pulling the law in practice closer to what the common sense justice of 
folk wisdom demands.  Emotion theorist J.R. Averill offered this example: 
By attributing his response to anger (or temporary insanity), an accused 
killer is in effect asking the jury to judge him not by the standards that 
prohibit the deliberate taking of life, but by the standards (sometimes 
called the “unwritten law”) that encourage protection of home and honor.  
There is a problem, however.  The proscription against homicide does not 
allow many exceptions. The killing must therefore be redefined: No longer 
is it the act of a normal human being; rather, it is the result of an irrational, 
animal-like impulse (anger) or the symptom of a disease (temporary 
insanity).226 
The point is not necessarily that legal categories departing from folk ones are therefore wrong.  
Rather, what matters is that the two categories often diverge, creating a risk of mis-defining who 
the killer is and what he has done.  From his perspective, the killing was done for the sake of 
honor, but that is not a defense the law will allow. The killer is, of course, likely ignorant of the 
specifics of the law.227 But this observation is no surprise because laypersons do generally view 
the law as speaking a technical, priest-like language, divorced from everyday understandings.228 
[P]eople’s sympathy toward crimes of passion is aroused not by the uncontrollability per se 
of the emotion, but by the values that give rise to the emotion. Society and the Law want 
people to value human life, but also to value marital fidelity, personal honor, and so on, and 
these additional values require accommodation. From this perspective, the reasons why the 
Law allows them mitigation or excusing of crimes of passion is that the community has 
sympathy for the person who is torn between important values that are both endorsed by the 
community. 
Id. at 88. 
226 J.R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION 124 (1982). 
227 See, e.g., James R.P. Ogloff & V. Gordon Rose, The Comprehension of Jury Instructions, in PSYCHOLOGY AND 
LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 407, 408 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams ed.s 2005) (noting that, given 
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228 See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 3 (1999) (noting that lawyers’ “unusual vocabulary may alienate 
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At some gut level, therefore, even the most truthful of suspects must understand the grave risk 
that his words will be misunderstood or misused, with potentially tragic consequences.229 
A second source of potential miscommunication in the law comes from its conception of 
narrative.  Narratives of course play a crucial role in any trial.230 But the criminal law usually 
seeks to cabin those narratives, to limit them in time and space.231 Yet “[n]arratives exert a 
strong influence over the perception of responsibility and culpability.”232 Emotions play a 
central role in story-creation, yet emotions too have a narrative structure.233 Folk assessments of 
emotions and culpability in fact have complex narrative structures that evolve over time and 
space.234 We crave to know the history leading up to an emotional episode and ensuing action, 
sometimes a quite extended history that examines childhood, school, and adolescence, work and 
play experiences, and pivotal life events.235 Emotions themselves, cognitive psychologists have 
come to recognize, are more processes developing over time than discrete responses.236 Yet the 
law looks to a narrow frame of time and circumstances, emphasizing, for example, whether the 
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shooter pleading self-defense feared imminent serious bodily injury at the precise moment of the 
shooting over the extended life histories that may have brought the two parties to that fateful 
moment.237 As psychology professors Norman J. Finkel and Gerrod Parrott conclude: 
 A potential conflict between folk and academic conceptions, on the 
one hand, and the Law’s views, on the other, can already be foreseen. The 
Law, with its typically narrow focus on the moment of the act, tends to see 
emotions statically and as simplistic stories rather than as complex 
narrative episodes in which appraisals develop and change across time, 
situations and circumstances, and in which the very emotion may 
transform into another emotion.238 
The law thus raises the risk of mis-definition by simply narrowing the social framework and 
breadth of individual life experiences that ordinary folks consider important in making 
culpability assessments.  It is again likely that persons ensnared in the criminal justice system 
intuitively understand the miscommunication that may result from everyday culpability 
assessments being strained through the filters of evidence and substantive criminal law.239 The 
conflict between the widened vision of the everyday and the narrowed vision of the criminal law 
has been well-captured, again by professors Finkel and Parrott, who explain: 
 Thus, in moral philosophy as in folk psychology, the moral 
significance of emotions is bound up in the particularities of their context.  
In everyday life, people think of emotions in narrative episodes because 
they are concerned with what emotions say about events, responsibility, 
and character, and when ordinary people enter the courtroom as jurors, 
they frame evidence in narrative episodes (often in emotional episodes) 
because they are concerned with assessing culpability in the context of the 
“story” in which it occurs.240 
237 See Taslitz, Abuse Excuses, supra note 231, at 1054-65. 
238 FINKEL & PARROTT, supra note 223, at 97. 
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In sum, the criminal justice system raises special and heightened risks of mis-description 
with unique and dramatically more severe potential consequences.  It may be good for the soul to 
choose to confess to one’s priest in the isolation of the confessional box knowing that your 
secrets go no further than the clergyman’s ears. It may even be redemptive to confess to a narrow 
circle of friends and family, recognizing the risk that they may spread your tale beyond its 
intended audience.241 But compelled confessions in the context of the criminal justice system are 
of a wholly different order.  They are sui generis and should be treated as such.   
III. The Literal Voice 
As mentioned earlier, by the “literal voice” I mean those aspects of the sound and content of 
our voices that, often unconsciously, influence our self-concept and our relationships with other 
persons and groups.  The concept of the literal voice includes the content of our words for the 
overt information that they purport to transmit but also includes their covert or meta-information 
- - information about our social status, personality, emotions, geographical location, group 
affiliations, gender, and intelligence.242 It is the meta-information that I emphasize here because 
it is that aspect of the literal voice that courts and legal commentators so often ignore. 
 American culture tends to emphasize the eye over the ear, the written over the spoken.243 Yet 
the spoken word is the more fundamental form of communication.244 It is speech that evolved 
first, our brains developing into high-speed computers for extracting social information from 
spoken words.245 Every culture develops categories associating certain speech qualities with 
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certain social characteristics, such as social status or power.246 Humans seek to identify each 
person’s voice as a mark of a unique individual, an essential component part of what makes each 
of us different from one another, while also using the voice as a way to identify or create 
commonalities.247 Gossip in particular evolved partly to promote social bonding.248 The written 
word necessarily functions differently - - lacking, for example, tone, volume, and pitch - - from 
the spoken.249 Yet writing is ultimately derivative of speaking, another medium for the 
expression of voice, a point to which I will return later.250 
Sociologist Anne Karpf has summarized the importance of the human voice this way: 
 Throughout our lives we make decisions, often unwittingly, on the 
basis of the sound of a person’s voice: lovers as well as political 
candidates get selected for vocal reasons.  Our lilt, twang, or tremor is 
eloquent beyond words.  The voice can also make sentences do 
somersaults.  “I don’t think so” might be an innocent expression or 
withering sarcasm - - the voice tells us which.  “Not bad” - - given the 
right tone - - can glow with praise.  Yet signal oddly with your voice - - by 
transgressing the normal codes of volume, pause, and pitch - - and you can 
entirely sabotage conversation, turning sense into nonsense.251 
246 See infra text accompanying notes 338-402. 
247 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 1-3 (making this point); D.R. Van Lancker & J. Kreiman, Voice 
Discrimination and Recognition as Separate Abilities, 25 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 829 (1987) (offering supporting 
empirical data). 
248 See Robert F. Goodman, Introduction, in GOOD GOSSIP 3 (Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-Ze‘ev ed.s 1994) 
(summarizing social functions of gossip); see generally DUNBAR, supra note 117 (arguing that the need to gossip 
was the primary force in the evolution of human language). Goodman explains that: 
[G]ossip promotes friendship and group cohesion, helps to sustain group norms, and often 
serves to effectively communicate important information.  Social scientists also emphasize 
that gossip may be important to the extent that it provides bases for the comparison of an 
individual’s experiences, feelings, and beliefs with those of others; contributes to one’s 
sense of self-esteem by revealing other people’s failings; and enhances status among peers. 
Goodman, supra, at 3. 
249 See infra text accompanying notes 403-63. 
250 See infra text accompanying notes 403-63. 
251 KARPF, supra note 243, at 1. 
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The voice can convey information about ourselves that we choose to reveal, many of us 
“code-switching,” having different voices for different situations or audiences.252 “From 
teachers to receptionists to lawyers, around a quarter of the total labor force is in a vocally 
demanding profession, or uses their voice as their primary tool of trade.”253 Yet the Wall Street 
lawyer who chooses to convey confidence and a sense of noblesse oblige with his corporate 
clients may lapse into the relaxed street slang of his Bronx roots when returning to the old 
neighborhood, baby talk when alone with his lover, or use soft, high-pitched tones when reading 
fairy tales to his four year old child.254 But merely by speaking we can also convey much that 
we might prefer to hide.  The sound of our voice can reveal illness, intoxication, and exhaustion, 
social class, education, and sexual desire.255 Our voice can encourage intimacy or distance, 
instill confidence or fear, undermine or support an opponent or friend, frequently without our 
conscious awareness or willingness to do these things.256 Voice is essential to the development 
of healthy emotional ties, empathy, and social skills but can unwittingly erode all those things.257 
Even if all we are doing is reading sewage disposal regulations aloud, “our voice is doing 
something terrifyingly intimate - - leaking information about our biological, psychological, and 
social status.  Through it, our size, height, weight, physique, sex, age and occupation…can be 
detected.”258 As voice specialist Anne Karpf again explains, the voice: 
Bridges our internal and external worlds. Traveling from our most private 
recesses into the public domain, revealing not only our deepest sense of 
who we are, but also who we wish we weren’t.  It’s a superb guide for fear 
 
252 See JENNIFER COATES, WOMEN, MEN, AND LANGUAGE 151 (2d ed. 1993) (“code” or “style-switching” means 
“learning which [language] styles are appropriate in which contexts”). 
253 KARPF, supra note 243, at 18-19. 
254 These are examples of a kind of code–switching done to achieve different social goals in different contexts.  See 
COATES, supra note 252, at 151 (defining code-switching). 
255 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 10-11. 
256 See id. at 4. 
257 See id. at 3. 
258 Id. at 10. 
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and power, anxiety and subservience, to another person’s vitality and 
authenticity as well as our own.259 
This invasion of the self can be unsettling, therefore, even when the judgments made based 
upon our voice are accurate.260 But the human drive to make such judgments is so strong that 
others will do so even when they are often wrong or their voice sample and other contextual 
information is limited.261 Accordingly, having control over when and how we talk is central to 
our efforts to control what sides of ourselves we reveal, in what contexts, and for what purposes.  
Yet this control is limited.  By speaking at all, we reveal much we might rather not and face the 
risk that judgments, fair and unfair, accurate or not, will be made about our essential nature.262 
These judgments have psychic impacts, affecting our self-esteem and self-identity, and having 
social and material impacts, affecting whether others trust us, open themselves up to us, offer us 
educational or employment opportunities, invite us into their groups, or welcome us into their 
homes.263 Control over our voice is thus critical to maintaining our mental privacy.  At some 
level, conscious or not, we understand this power of the voice, and we both celebrate and fear it.  
This section III of this article seeks to elaborate why this is so, exploring the voice’s power in the 
illustrative areas of emotion-reading, personality judgments, relative social status generally, 
group belonging and exclusion, and gendered relationships.  Next this section considers the 
implications of the written word and technology and their implications for better understanding 
 
259 Id. at 4. 
260 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 181-209 (addressing the broader problem of fear of mis-definition, of which 
mis-definition in response to one’s voice is a subset). 
261 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 3 (“The ability quickly to classify others and use those judgments to guide 
behavior predicts success in all aspects of life. The ancestors of current humans - - those who won the evolutionary 
battle - - were equipped to learn and apply the social rules of voice.”); infra text accompanying notes 310-35 
(illustrating this phenomenon of making quick character judgments based upon a stranger’s voice). This tendency to 
judge personality based on limited voice data is, of course, also a subset of our broader tendency toward snap 
judgments about character.  See supra text accompanying notes 182-89 (discussing the “fundamental attribution 
error.”). 
262 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 3 (noting that each society’s rules about how to use categories of voices 
and words “provide systematic guidance for determining gender-, personality-, and emotion-specific actions.  These 
rules also advise people whom to like, whom to trust, and with whom to do business.”). 
263 See id. at 3.  
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the privilege against self-incrimination, before turning, in the article’s penultimate section, to the 
idea of linguistic compulsion as at the heart of the Fifth Amendment privilege.   
 A. Voicing Emotions 
Emotions focus our attention on whatever causes them. The more intense the emotion, 
the more focused is our attention.264 Voices can powerfully convey, both by their sound and 
content, emotions, while simultaneously eliciting them in others.265 “Turn, here now! Oh, my 
God!,” screamed in terror by a car passenger, for example, tends to elicit fear, intense 
concentration, and immediate aversive action by the driver.266 
Emotions also alter how we filter experience, including concerning matters unrelated to the 
event that originally elicited the emotion.267 A happy person is simply more likely than a sad one 
to interpret experiences in a positive rather than a negative fashion.268 Positive emotions also 
improve, on the one hand, much thinking flexibility and efficiency, making it easier to find 
creative solutions to difficult problems.269 Simultaneously, on the other hand, positive emotions, 
perhaps paradoxically, increase reliance on stereotypes, making their bearer more likely to be 
“influenced by labels, such as the gender, accent, and personality [believed to be revealed 
 
264 See DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 14-15 (2006) 
(noting that one of the central organs for processing emotions, the amygdala, “acts as a radar for the brain, calling 
attention to whatever might be new, puzzling, or important to learn more about.”); GEORGE MARCUS, ET AL., 
AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 1 (2000) (arguing that emotions determine when citizens pay 
serious attention to political issues rather than relying on political habits); NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 77 
(“Emotions direct and focus people’s attention on those objects and situations that have been appraised as important 
to people’s needs and goals”). 
265 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 77 (illustrating how voices can activate emotions); GOLEMAN, supra note 
264, at 14-17 (describing how voices and body language can cause “emotional contagion,” the spread of emotions 
from one person to others). 
266 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 77 (using similar example). 
267 See id. at 77-78 (making similar point); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the 
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L.& WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 410-18 (1996) (discussing “epistemology filters” and how 
they operate to alter perceptions of reality). 
268 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 77-78. 
269 See id. 
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by]…the voice.”270 Positive emotions also make their bearers more risk averse.271 But our 
voices can often reveal our emotions in very subtle ways.  Meanwhile, listeners are primed to try 
to read emotions from our voices, sometimes doing so accurately, sometimes not.272 Yet what 
listeners perceive in speakers’ emotions can and does alter the listeners’ own feelings.273 
Frequently this happens because listeners mimic the emotions that they perceive in speakers, 
including in their voices.274 Emotions can thus become contagious.275 
Voices convey emotions by variations in speech rate, pitch average, pitch range and intensity, 
voice quality, pitch changes and their speed, and the precision and nature of articulation.276 
Depression is notably readily identifiable via the voice, which becomes quieter, less inflected, 
and “has a dull, lifeless quality,”277 trailing off at the end of a sentence, “as if the speaker is 
sighing while talking.”278 Writer William Styron recalled that his depression resulted in “the 
lamentable near-disappearance of my voice.  It underwent a strange transformation, becoming at 
times quite faint, wheezy and spasmodic - - a friend observed later that it was the voice of a 90-
year old.”279 The voices of manic-depressives in their manic phase, by contrast, are vigorous, 
 
270 Id. at 78. 
271 Id. (“[A]lthough people in a positive mood are more risk-prone when making hypothetical decisions, they tend to 
be more cautious when presented with an actual risk situation.”). 
272 See id. at 95 (“Because the brain tightly integrates the emotion of voice and the emotion of words, consistency 
between them is critical, even when they are generated by a clearly synthetic, unemotional machine). 
273 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 13-20. 
274 See id. at 18. 
275 See id. at 13 (“[E]motions are contagious. We ‘catch’ strong emotions much as we do a rhinovirus - - and so can 
come down with the emotional equivalent of a cold.”). 
276 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 95 (charting how these voice qualities operate together to convey 
emotion). 
277 KARPF, supra note 243, at 136-37. 
278 Id. at 137. 
279 WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (2001). The voice also differs among types of 
depression and mental illness.  See Julian Leff & Evelyn Abberton, Voice Pitch Measurements  in Schizophrenia 
and Depression, 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE (1981); See SPEECH EVALUATION IN PSYCHIATRY (John K. Darby 
ed. 1981). 
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with glides, frequent emphases, and wide pitch variation. 280 Yet voices convey emotions not 
merely for the mentally ill but in every human encounter.281 
This observation does not necessarily mean, however, that we are as accurate as with these 
extreme situations in judging more subtle emotional cues in voices.  Judgments about another’s 
emotions are initially made very quickly, and we are most likely to judge correctly with those we 
know best.282 Indeed, vocal sensitivity to another’s emotions is one important hallmark of an 
intimate relationship, a reflection of one person’s more complete knowledge of another’s habits 
and behavior.283 Voice-reading is thus “a form of empathy: we tune into what another person is 
thinking and feeling….”284 We supplement our judgments about another’s emotions with 
observations about their facial expressions and about the social context in addition to the sound 
and content of their voices.285 Nevertheless, errors in our judgments may lead to 
miscommunication and conflict, especially between intimates, whom we expect to do better.286 
There is also some evidence of gender variation in the ability to detect emotions from voice, 
women doing the better job, and of parenting styles influencing children’s development of this 
skill.287 Less powerful or lower status people are also more likely to be “finely attuned to 
 
280 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 137. 
281 See id. at 138 (noting that simple boredom, anxiety, happiness, contempt, anger, grief, surprise, and scorn may 
each have their own distinctive vocal signatures); Tom Johnstone & Klaus R. Scherer, Vocal Communication of 
Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones ed.s 2d ed. 2000) (analyzing 
contempt, anger, and stress). 
282 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 140-45 (making and illustrating this point). 
283 See id. at 141-42; Marylous Pauswang Gelfer & Shannon Ryan Young, Comparisons of Intensity Measures and 
their Stability in Male and Female Speakers, 11 J. OF VOICE (1997) (explaining how voice reading is an exercise in 
empathy). 
284 KARPF, supra note 243, at 142. 
285 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 97-100. 
286 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 142-45. 
287 See id. at 143-45. 
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nuances in the voices of those people with authority over them,” such as children’s sensitivity to 
the vocal nuances of parents and teachers, “a form of protection against adult fiat.”288 
A listener believing that he has perceived a speakers’ emotions will often subconsciously 
physically react in a similar fashion, a way of building empathy, which in turn increases the 
accuracy of the listener’s judgments in reading emotions.289 The listener’s subjective experience, 
partly because of these physiological changes, will also often change to match the speaker’s 
feelings.290 In these ways, among others, speakers’ emotions “infect” listeners.291 Yet, 
remember, changed emotions mean changed perceptions, attitudes, and reasoning styles.292 
Moreover, emotional contagion by voice can happen to groups as well as individuals.293 
Furthermore, voice can influence listeners’ moods - - their sustained emotions - - as well as their 
more fleeting feelings.294 Vocal emotional contagion is manipulated by movie producers, 
loudness, screaming, and crying, for example, being ways to transmit powerful emotions or 
moods that rivet the audience’s attention to the source of their reaction.295 Vocal emotional and 
mood manipulation, because it alters perception, reasoning, and attention, is also a powerful tool 
 
288 See id. at 143.  For a summary of the impact that vocal indicators of status can have in the courtroom, see 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Court’s Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 17 
B.U. PUB. INT. L. REV. 145 (forthcoming 2007). 
289 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 25 (noting bodies mimic others’ emotions, better enabling accuracy in reading 
them); Karpf, supra note 243, at 141-42 (reading emotions from voices requires shifting to the others’ style of 
expressiveness to attain understanding.). 
290 See id. at 18, 20 (discussing contagious nature of emotions, including those conveyed by voice via loudness or 
emotional intensity like that involved in screaming or crying). 
291 See id. at 13. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 266-73; Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 221, at 9-12, 48-58. 
293 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 16 (“Such a contagion can occur with many people at a time, as visibly as 
when an audience mists up at a tragic movie scene, or as subtly as the tone of a meeting turning a bit testy.”). 
294 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 74-75 (making this point); Tanya L. Chartrand, et al., Beyond the 
Perception-Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious Mimicry, in THE 
NEW UNCONSCIOUS 334, 335-37, 341-44 (Ran R. Hasin, et al. ed.s 2005) (discussing speech mimicry and emotional 
mood contagion, including via the voice). 
295 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 20. 
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of persuasion, including as used by politicians or social activists seeking to motivate political 
enthusiasm in their supporters or to expand the size of the supporter pool.296 
Inconsistency between voice content and tone can be perceived as insincerity - - “I am so 
sorry” said flatly or mockingly, for example - - and can be jarring.297 Consistency between the 
two makes the speaker better liked by listeners.298 Our ability to judge others’ emotions vocally 
and to react with vocal appropriateness also affects their feelings toward us.299 Thus listeners 
generally prefer speakers conveying happy emotions.300 But the expression of negative emotions 
can sometimes elicit valuable responses, such as when we vocally convey vulnerability, leading 
a listener to protect us, or when a listener becomes more trusting of us when we are willing to 
expose to them an attitude of submission - - much like the reaction a dog seeks in exposing its 
belly.301 
This last example emphasizes two roads for emotions - - the “low” road of the unconscious 
and the “high” road of the conscious mind.302 Many of the emotions we vocally convey or 
perceive happen rapidly and unconsciously.303 But our slower, more deliberative, conscious 
assessments of a situation - - frequently made in the form of an internal mental self-conversation 
 
296 See generally, DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE 
NATION (2007) (giving numerous illustrations of such manipulation as part of a wider study of the role of emotions 
in political persuasion). 
297 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 87-88. 
298 See id. at 86; M. Argyle, et al., The Communication of Friendly and Hostile Attitudes by Verbal and Non-Verbal 
Signals, 1 EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCH. 285 (1971). 
299 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 85-88. 
300 See id. at 91-92 (“Humans are built with ‘hedonic preference’ - - the tendency to experience, express, and 
perceive more positive emotions than negative ones. In social interactions, people like others who display positive 
emotions more than those who display negative emotions”); P.A. Bell, Affective State, Attraction, and Affiliation: 
Misery Loves Happy Company Too, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 616 (1978) (a person showing positive 
emotions is perceived as more attractive and a more likeable colleague). 
301 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 92; H.S. Friedman, et al., Nonverbal Skill, Personal Charisma, and Initial 
Attraction, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 203 (1988) (discussing value of “opening up” and conveying 
vulnerability or submission). 
302 See GOLEMAN, supra note 264, at 15-17 (using “high” and “low” road terminology). 
303 See id. at 15-16. 
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- - can alter our assessments of a situation, such as whether we were correct in perceiving danger 
or fear in another’s voice.304 Altered assessments in turn alter emotions and moods.305 
But here is the rub.  Speakers can also make conscious assessments, permitting them to 
attempt to alter their vocal expressions to convey emotions by conscious choice.  Sometimes 
these efforts may be sincere ones to communicate feelings more clearly, other times calculated 
efforts to mislead a listener about our true emotions.306 People vary in their ability successfully 
to feign emotions.307 Combine this observation with variation in individuals’ ability accurately 
to read emotions and a real risk arises of a good faker’s taking advantage of a poor judger.308 
Add to the mix the reality that the content of our words - - such as reporting a dangerous event - - 
can, separate and apart from the pitch, volume, and other aspects of the sound of our words - - 
alter listener’s emotions, and it becomes clear, in ways both large and small, how the emotional 
voice can be a conscious tool of political power as well as a means for promoting intimacy or 
distancing.309 The power of the emotion-laden and emotion-inducing voice, the often 
unconscious processes that may leak what we wish kept secret, the risk of misunderstanding and 
resulting ill consequences, and the dangers of manipulation all make the simple acts of speaking 
and listening as dangerous as they are advantageous. 
 B. Personality 
304 See id. at 75-77 (illustrating the reassessment precess and its effect). 
305 See Taslitz, Forgetting Freud, supra note 288, at 169-76 (analyzing the connection between cognitive 
assessments and emotions); Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 221, at 9-12 (analyzing this same connection in 
greater depth). 
306 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 145-46 (discussing vocal deception). 
307 See id. at 146.  (Strangely, “the detection rates of most professional lie-catchers are modest, and the people 
trained to look for non-verbal clues to deceitful behaviour often do less well than ordinary, untrained listeners”). 
308 See id. at 146 (noting individual variation in ability to decode emotion accurately from voice). 
309 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 86-88 (explaining how voice tone and content interact); supra text 
accompanying notes 282-88 (explaining how interpretations of events alter emotions); see generally WESTEN, supra 
note 296 (collecting numerous illustrations of how voice content and tone, combined with other factors, contribute 
to political manipulation); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND 24-31 (1990) [hereinafter DON’T
UNDERSTAND] (explaining how the voice can be used to promote distancing or intimacy). 
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People are frequently drawn to others whom they perceive as having similar 
personalities.310 Simultaneously, people are most comfortable with other persons about whom 
clear personality judgments can be made. Ambiguity or inconsistency in indicators of personality 
causes discomfort, dislike, and confusion.311 The relative influence of these drives toward 
similarity-attraction and consistency itself varies with the judger’s personality.  Persons who are 
more outwardly-oriented toward social relationships care more about similarity to others, while 
inner-oriented persons give greater weight to consistency.312 
Similarity and consistency matter to judgers because of the resulting perceived social 
benefits.313 If one person has a clear image of another person’s having a similar personality, that 
makes the latter’s behavior and thoughts more predictable to the first person.314 This perceived 
predictability occurs because he can imagine how he would behave or think in similar 
situations.315 Furthermore, less cognitive effort to make such predictions is required than would 
be true were the first person facing someone of an ambiguous or very different personality.316 
Predictability promotes a sense of safety, while similarity both implies familiarity, which leads to 
liking, and social support, which leads to sharing, including of such things as food, shelter, 
rituals, and language.317 
310 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 57. 
311 See id. 
312 See id. 
313 See id. at 10. 
314 See, e.g., H. H. Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, in 15 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 
192 (D. Levine ed. 1967); H.H. Kelley, The Processes of Casual Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973); 
L.Z. MacArthur, The How and What of Why: Some Determinants and Consequences of Causal Attribution, 22 J. 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 171 (1972). 
315 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 10. 
316 See id.; H.A. SIMON, SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (3d ed. 1996) (arguing that humans prefer “cognitive 
economy”). 
317 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 10; B. Monin, The Warm Glow Heuristic: When Liking Leads to 
Familiarity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1035 (2003); A.M. Colman, W.M. Best, & A.J. Austen, Familiarity 
and Liking: Direct Tests of the Preference-Feedback Hypothesis, 58 PSYCH. REPORTS 931 (1986); K.W. Kerber & 
R. Singleton, Trait and Situational Attributions in a Naturalistic Setting: Familiarity, Liking, and Attribution 
Validity, 52 J. PERSONALITY 205 (1984). 
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This need for predictability contributes to the “fundamental attribution error,” our willingness 
to make confident and global character judgments about others - - even those others very 
different from ourselves - - based upon very limited evidence.318 Predictability also helps to 
explain why, if we know little of another’s personality, we prefer those people behaving like 
extroverts because expressive people are seen as more predictable than reticent ones.319 
The voice is often viewed as a window into another’s soul. Several paralinguistic features of 
voice are taken as personality indicators, at least in American culture.320 Notably, volume alone 
implies character: “compare the booming voice of a person who loves socializing to the soft 
voice of someone who prefers to read books.”321 How high or low is one’s pitch also affects 
personality perceptions, such as the high voice of the “hyperactive comedian” versus the “deep 
voiced news anchor.”322 Pitch range matters too, as in the wide pitch swings of the “animated 
story teller” compared to the “monotone delivery of the technical presenter.” 323 Likewise, those 
whose intonation rises at the end of an assertion are viewed as tentative while those whose tone 
falls appear self-confident.324 Speech rate conveys an exuberant nature for the fast talker and a 
calm one for the more deliberate speaker.325 These four indicators of volume, pitch, pitch 
variation, and speech rate may have an even more powerful impact on personality assessment 
than does speech content.326 Moreover, 
 
318 See MCEWAN, supra note, 160, at 10-15, 33, 44, 102, 165, 170. 
319 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 42.  But see RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW 
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321 Id. at 34. 
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Each of these voice characteristics tells us something about a person, 
but in combination they become particularly influential.  For example, 
when people meet someone who speaks loudly and rapidly, in a high 
pitch, and with a wide voice range, they feel confident that they are 
dealing with the life of the party.  Conversely, when people hear a soft, 
deep, monotone voice speaking slowly, they feel equally confident that 
this person is shy.327 
High-pitched, rapid voices with wide frequency range are also perceived as warm and 
sympathic, those with the opposite voice characteristics being “hermits and misanthropes, who 
have contempt for others but don’t actively attack or defend….”328 Perhaps more importantly, 
however, loud, deep voices of limited range (think John Wayne) convey dominance - - persons 
who control their environments - - while soft, high voices of wide range are apparent 
submissives, “buffeted by events and people and…essentially actionless.”329 Dominance brings 
with it high social status, while submissiveness is associated with low social status.330 
Voice content, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, also conveys personality signals.  For 
example, words urging others to action rather than requesting it mark extroverts, as do words 
demonstrating confidence rather than insecurity.331 More specific, concrete descriptions of 
events may lead to a more positive evaluation of the speaker than do vague, cursory ones.332 If 
content cues and paralinguistic ones conflict, that conveys an ambiguity of personality, with all 
 
327 NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 34. 
328 Id. at 43. 
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330 See TANNEN, DON’T UNDERSTAND, supra note 309, at 24-25. 
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the ill consequences of that confusion described above.333 Consistency, by contrast, makes a 
speaker more likeable.334 
Yet there is little empirical evidence suggesting that our voice-based personality assessments 
are accurate. What little research there is often suggests the opposite.335 So, once again, the mere 
act of speaking - - which always activates quick, automatic, unconscious personality judgments - 
- risks grave misunderstanding of the speaker’s nature by his audience, potentially leading them 
to dislike him, distrust him, dismiss him, or dominate him.336 But, above all, is his fear that they 
will misjudge him, or at least rob him of the chance to control the evidence upon which these 
judgments are made.337 
E. Status Generally 
Paralinguistic features of speech both reflect and help to create our position in the social 
hierarchy - - our “social status” - - and our social connection to, or distance from, socially salient 
groups.338 Social roles are those conventional modes of behavior society expects to be adopted 
by persons of a certain status, conventions that pointedly include linguistic features.339 Each 
person plays a variety of roles in her life, each correlated to a different status within and between 
 
333 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 9-51; supra text accompanying notes 313-17. 
334 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 54.  
335 See id. at 39 (“[W]hile people perceive voices to be good indicators of personality and respond accordingly, voice 
characteristics may be deceptive); KARPF, supra note 243, at 136, 138-40 (arguing much of the research on divining 
emotions from voice says more about our ability to spot theatrical or staged emotions accurately than subtle ordinary 
ones). 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 310-31. 
337 See supra text accompanying notes 161-211. 
338 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 187 (“In fact, quite fine distinctions of status are discernible through the voice, 
even to listeners who don’t understand the language of the speakers.”) (emphasis in original), 278 (“In fact you can 
almost read off status or dominance from the degree to which one speaker accommodates [to the speaking style of] 
another.”); DAVID CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS: HOW BABIES BABBLE, WORDS CHANGE MEANING, AND 
LANGUAGES LIVE OR DIE 310-11 (2005) (discussing the connection between linguistic conventions and social 
status). 
339 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 309-10. 
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various social groups.340 For example, a man who is an apprentice at work may hold a low social 
status there but a higher one at home if his spouse and children perceive him as the head of the 
family.  Accordingly, his speech loudness, intonation, tempo, rhythm, and other linguistic 
features will vary between those two settings.341 Although different roles elicit linguistic 
differences, such differences are themselves understood by listeners as markers of social roles or 
status, even if the audience knows nothing else about the speaker but his words.342 Thus a man 
using a standard accent (the one most prized by his society), speaking quickly and fluently, with 
few hesitations, is seen by his audience as more competent, dominant, and dynamic than those 
who lack these features.343 On the other hand, a person using regional or ethnic accents, 
disfluent and halting speech, is more likely to be seen as relatively incompetent and submissive, 
of a low social status, yet may also be seen by many hearers as more approachable and likeable 
than his imposing high status counterpart.344 
One important indicator of solidarity with, or distance from, members of various social 
groups is geographic: do speaker and listener hail from the same home territory?345 Although 
Americans are geographically mobile, the place of their youth may always hold a powerful 
psychic pull on them, as may, in a different way, their current place of residence.346 Ex-New 
Yorkers may proudly identify themselves as such, Tennesseans may boast of their Southern 
charm and hospitability, and naturalized American citizens may wear clothes or join social clubs 
 
340 See id. at 310-11. 
341 See id. at 311. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. at 287. 
344 See id. at 287. 
345 See id. at 290, 293-94 (discussing accents as markers of geographic brother and sisterhood); NASS & BRAVE,
supra note 244, at 67-68 (noting accent is a means of social identification). 
346 See CRYSTAL, supra note 339, at 293-94 (noting that, despite growing geographic mobility, there is no evidence 
to suggest that accents “are losing their role as markers of identity in society….If we want to display to others where 
we are from,…[s]peech is the most universal way of expressing our regional identity.”). 
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that draw on customs of the “old country.”347 Each person may vary in the intensity with which 
geographic ties matter to him or her, but for many people those ties are strong.  They matter 
because they are one basis for a sense of group-solidarity, which also often means a sense of 
distinctiveness and separation from other, perhaps opposing, groups.348 Linguistic features, 
particularly accent (distinctive ways of pronunciation) and dialect (distinctive forms of grammar 
and vocabulary), are powerful indicators of geographic ties.349 When anyone wishes to 
emphasize his connection to a geographic group, he tries to speak like that group’s members, and 
not like those of other groups. The Mississippian migrant to New York City who years later 
retains a heavy Southern drawl, peppering her conversations with “y’all,” is making a conscious 
or unconscious statement of Southern pride.350 Linguistics professor David Crystal made the 
point this way: 
 It seems totally natural to speak like the other members of our own group 
and not to speak like the members of other groups.  The tendency, well 
recognized in modern sociolinguistics, is called accommodation. It is an 
ability which probably emerged early on in the evolution of the human race 
because it had considerable survival value.  When primitive people heard 
voices outside a cave, did they go outside to greet them with a smile or 
proceed cautiously with a club?  Recognizing the Cro-Magnon equivalent of 
an accent would have made all the difference.351 
Group membership is partly an individual’s choice concerning with which group to 
identify.352 Actual or feigned accent or dialect can be a way to announce or share group 
 
347 Cf. id. at 293 (noting clothing, badges, and the like are other ways to express ethnic pride); TANNEN, DON’T
UNDERSTAND, supra note 244, at 201, 205, 208 (discussing with pride the New York Jewish conversational style). 
348 See CRYSTAL, supra note 339, at 293-94 (discussing accents and dialects as means of group identification and 
connection); NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 68-70 (discussing how accents activate status-stereotypes). 
349 See CRYSTAL¸ supra note 339, at 289-94 (defining “accent” and “dialect” and explaining their social 
significance). 
350 See id. at 294 (making similar point but at a higher level of generality). 
351 Id. 
352 See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY (1999) (presenting an extended defense of just 
this point). 
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membership based on ethnicity, religion, or innumerable other traits rather than on geography.353 
As someone born in America to American-born Jewish parents whose own parents were 
immigrants from the Ukraine, I can offer this example: my friends and family members often 
lapse among themselves into exaggerated Eastern European accents, periodically filling our 
speech with Yiddish phrases.  We do so as a way of social bonding and expressing ethnic and 
religious pride, even though most of us ordinarily have New York accents more than Eastern 
European ones, do not know the meaning of most Yiddish words, and are not particularly 
observant of religious ritual.  Language use of this sort is an effective means of ethnic bonding 
because it is a widespread feature of community life, offers a link with a shared imagined past, 
and acts as a natural demarcation line among cultural groups.354 
Socioeconomic class is also often assumed to be indicated by speech patterns.355 Each of us 
perceives some features of vocabulary and grammar as associated with intelligence and 
education, others with intellectual weakness and ignorance.356 These common perceptions were 
well illustrated in the play “My Fair Lady,” in which the lead male character, a professor, can 
turn his charge, Eliza Dolittle, into a lady only by purging her of her lower-class Cockney accent 
and dialect.357 A real world American illustration comes from the dropping of “g”s at the end of 
words, a pronunciation typical of much of the speech of the modern American working class.358 
353 See CRYSTAL, supra note 339, at 302 (noting these other bases for linguistic group membership); cf. NASS &
BRAVE, supra note 244, at 70-71 (noting that people will even create new social categories and accompanying 
linguistic markers, as illustrated by recent developments on the internet, thereby creating psuedoscommunity, an 
artificial bond between a diverse set of people.”) (emphasis in original). 
354 See id. at 303-04. 
355 See id. at 309-10. 
356 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 68-70 (discussing and illustrating this point in the contexts of class, race, 
age, and ethnicity). 
357 See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW & ALAN JAY LERNER, PYGMALION AND MY FAIR LADY (2006) (combining the text 
and score of the musical, My Fair Lady, an adaptation of George Bernard Shaw’s play, Pygmalion, with the text of 
the latter). 
358 See CRYSTAL, supra note 339, at 309-10. 
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This feature might be combined with slurred pronunciation of adjacent words. Thus “Whatcha 
doin’?” is associated with the lower classes and “What are you doing?” with the higher ones.359 
Race is not correlated with any distinctive speech patterns, but race/class sub-groups are 
often perceived by those higher in the social hierarchy as displaying such patterns.360 Thus 
African-American English Vernacular (AAEV) is a form of non-standard English most often 
studied among economically lower-class African-Americans in urban areas.361 AAEV includes 
such features as dropping the final “s” in the third person singular (“he walk,” “she go”) and 
using the “invariant be” (“Sometimes they be walking round here”).362 These same features are, 
however, found in many white English dialects, particularly in the Southern United States.363 
This observation has led some commentators to conclude that AAEV arose from white dialects 
but then became associated with race as a result of Southern Black immigration to the North.364 
As one author put it:  
The association with blacks is then explained as a result of their 
emigration to the northern cities, where those features were perceived as a 
distinctive marker of ethnic, as opposed to regional, identity. With the 
development of urban ghettos, the contrast became more marked over 
time.365 
Other commentators instead conclude that AAEV arose primarily from a Creole English spoken 
by the first Blacks on American shores, though mixed with white dialects’ influence.366 
359 Anyone who has ever watched The Sporanos or grown up, as I did, in the South Bronx, recognizes these two 
forms of pronunciation (slurred and clear) and the status differences between them.  See also ROBERT HODGE &
GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 87-88 (1987) (distinguishing higher and lower status language forms). 
360 See CRYSTAL, supra note 334, at 306-08; NASS & BRAVE, supra note 244, at 66-67. 
361 See CRYSTAL, supra note 339, at 306-07. 
362 See id. Further background on African-American vernaculars can be found in JAMES HASKINS & HUGH BUTTS,
M.D., PSYCHOLOGY OF BLACK LANGUAGE (1993); THOMAS KOCHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CONFLICT 
(1981); Geneveva Smitherman, Testifying, Sermonizin’ and Signifying: Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the 
African-American Verbal Tradition, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN SPEAK OUT ON ANITA HILL-CLARENCE 
THOMAS 224, 224-41 (Geneva Smitherman ed. 1995) (analyzing the “African-American Verbal Tradition”). 
363 See CRYSTAL, supra note 39, at 306-07. 
364 See id. 
365 Id. at 307. 
366 See id. at 306-07. 
64
Whatever AAEV’s origin, middle class Whites may hear that dialect as a sign of intellectual 
inferiority and a marker of danger.367 
Gender matters too.  Some feminist theorists have long posited a “women’s language,” a set 
of linguistic features characteristic of how women speak in most settings.368 Among the posited 
features are the use of “meaningless particles” like “my goodness”; “empty adjectives” 
expressing entirely emotional assessments, as in “It’s adorable!,” and use of hedges like “I 
guess” or “I think,” conveying uncertainty.369 
Research has failed to confirm, or disconfirm, the existence of a women’s speech constant 
across contexts.370 Nevertheless, research has revealed some linguistic forms that women are 
more likely to use than men in a wide variety of settings. These forms include more expressions 
of positive politeness, sympathy, and understanding; fewer commands and threats; more phrases 
like “you know,” which show an effort to engage the addressee’s attention; and more statements 
 
367 See id. Professor Clifford Nass and Scott Brave explain: 
 In addition to social identification, accents [and dialects] in voice interfaces are likely to 
elicit stereotypes….Particular accents are associated with particular characteristics, whether 
those stereotypes are grounded in socialization processes or not. For example, in the United 
States, people with British accents are perceived as more intelligent than average, whereas 
people with Brooklyn accents are perceived as less intelligent than average, even though, as 
described by accent prestige theory, there is no formal basis for these stereotypes. Similarly, 
people with…Southern U.S. accents are perceived as more egalitarian (although there are 
racist stereotypes associated with Southern accents). 
 
BRAVE & NASS, supra note 244, at 68. There is some reason to believe that race alone is not an independent factor 
of much significance in social categorization based on voice. See id. at 69.  However, the AAEV and other African-
American vernaculars reflect the intersection of race, class, and geography.  See supra text accompanying notes 355-
67.  Moreover, once a speaker’s race is known, it is hard to believe that, barring any more salient indicators of 
status, race will not have a significant impact on an observer’s status judgments.  See, e.g., SOCIAL STRATIFICATION:
CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (D.B. Grusky ed. 2000) (collecting essays showing race 
to be among the most powerful predictors in the sociological literature). 
368 See ELIZABETH ARIES, MEN AND WOMEN IN INTERACTION: CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCES 102-46 (1996) 
(summarizing the literature on this point, including the work of its originator, Robin Lakoff); ROBIN TOLMACH 
LAKOFF, TALKING POWER: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE 202-06 (1990) (summarizing concisely Lakoff’s work in 
this area). 
369 See sources cited supra note 368. 
370 See MARY CRAWFORD, TALKING DIFFERENCE: ON GENDER AND LANGUAGE 28-40 (1995). 
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of self-reference, such as “It seems to me,” which show respect.371 Moreover, when women use 
imperatives, they are more likely to do so in question form and with qualifiers, as in “Would you 
get me that report by Monday, if at all possible?”372 Many of these observed differences are, 
however, more likely due to setting, topic, role, and status.  For example, those in lower-status 
positions (as are many women) use such politeness strategies toward those of higher status.373 
Even when women do not use “women’s language,” however, they are perceived as doing 
so.374 This perception arises because our stereotypes or “folklinguistic” beliefs about how 
women speak closely track the descriptions of women’s language.375 Stereotypes lead us to 
ignore contrary evidence while attending to confirming evidence.376 Furthermore, thee biases are 
magnified by the “fundamental attribution error,” our tendency to attribute behavior more to 
personality than context. 377 Consequently, when we see many women in low-status roles 
speaking politely, we attribute that behavior to women’s essential nature rather than to their 
role.378 The resulting linguistic stereotypes resist change, as they have in American culture for 
more than twenty years. 379 
One effect of perceiving women’s language where it does not exist and of viewing it as 
typical female behavior is the self-fulfilling prophecy.380 Women learn that they will be ignored 
 
371 See ARIES, supra note 368, at 104-29, 138-46 (summarizing research). 
372 See id. 
373 See id. 
374 See id. at 163-94 (summarizing and evaluating research). 
375 See DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 44 (2d ed. 1992) (describing Lakoff’s theory of a 
women’s language as consistent with “folklinguistics”); JENNIFER COATES, WOMEN, MEN, AND LANGUAGE 16-37 
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376 See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 15-19, 49-81 (2006) 
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or disliked if they violate stereotypical norms, so they try not to deviate too much from those 
norms.381 
Although other factors, such as age, race, and class, can reduce the effects of stereotypes, the 
effects are greatest where gender is most salient.382 But gender is most salient in initial 
encounters or where women are in the minority.383 Our gendered cognitive biases lessen, 
however, as we get to know individuals better.384 
The effect of the real or imagined use of women’s language can be devastating to a woman’s 
credibility.  Anyone using women’s language is evaluated as more caring but less credible, 
competent, and intelligent.385 These evaluations are magnified when women, rather than men, 
are the speakers.386 Furthermore, the indirectness supposedly characteristic of women’s 
language may be seen as insecurity, apology as weakness.387 Additionally, women’s language 
speakers’ use of shorter, less aggressive responses in public settings commands less attention.388 
Similarly, their giving reasons for their suggestions and arguing from their personal experience 
rather than from abstract principle, two “feminine” strategies, are relatively unpersuasive to 
men.389 These effects are much larger in laboratory settings than in the few studies involving 
 
381 See id. 
382 See id. at 186, 190-93, 203. 
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385 See id. at 178-84; JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 64-66 
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386 See ARIES, supra note 368, at 181-82. 
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naturally occurring speech, but even modest effects can be decisive in criminal cases.390 There, 
defense victory requires only “reasonable doubt.”391 
Yet women face a double bind if they violate stereotypical speech norms.392 Most men 
simply do not like aggressive women.  “There is a sense in which every woman is seen as a 
receptionist–available to give information and help, perennially interruptible.”393 Women who 
violate stereotypes may seem unlikable or unworthy to many men.394 Furthermore, men resist 
receiving information from those, like women, whom men perceive as of lower status because 
being lecturer rather than listener is the superior (i.e., men’s) role.395 
In sum, women may be perceived as using women’s language when they are not, a 
perception marking them as stupid, incompetent, and incredible.  Yet too masculine a style 
means they will be disliked or ignored. For a woman to be seen as credible, she must walk a fine 
line between opposed stereotypes.  
 This discussion of gender also highlights the broader importance of such contextual features 
as setting (the time and place of speaking, for example, in church or at work); the number of 
participants and the relationship among them (such as bystander versus intimate or superior 
versus subordinate); and the activity, notably cross-examining or debating, lecturing or 
dialoguing.396 Lower status persons speaking in public settings like courtrooms will often find 
 
390 See ARIES, supra note 368, at 178-84. 
391 See Larry King, Do Juries See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, in BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT iii-xx (Larry 
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396 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
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themselves speaking a more “powerless language,” akin to that of the posited women’s language 
just discussed; facing frequent interruptions from higher status figures like lawyers; and 
struggling to hold the floor and tell their complete story.397 Their testimony will more likely be 
perceived as less credible than those using higher-status linguistic forms.398 In short, though 
many factors affect victory or defeat at trial, lower status witnesses start with the linguistic deck 
stacked against them. 
 Other legal settings that can prove to be problematic for laymen and lower-status speakers 
are conversations with undercover officers or interrogations by badge-carrying officers.399 
Linguists have extensively documented how undercover agents can encourage ambiguous but 
arguably inculpatory suspect statements; cut off suspect efforts to explain or more clearly specify 
those statements; camouflage the illegal nature of agent offers made to the suspect, while later 
arguing that that criminal nature was obvious; and use leading questions, misinterpreting 
minimal suspect responses (e.g., Uh-huh”) as signs of agreement with the agent’s implied 
statements rather than discomfort with their ambiguity or potential criminal nature.400 These 
strategies are rarely apparent to juries, who often give the resulting statements unfairly 
inculpatory explanations and undue weight.401 Other researchers have extensively documented 
similar strategies in police interrogation practices.402 
397 See CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 385, at 65-66. 
398 See id. 
399 See ROGERT W. SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES: HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT USES (AND MISUSES)
LANGUAGES 109-70 (2005) (illustrating this point, primarily concerning undercover agents, in a wide variety of 
settings) [hereinafter LANGUAGE CRIMES]; see generally ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION,
INTERROGATION, AND DECEPTION (1998) (doing the same for interrogations). 
400 See SHUY, LANGUAGE CRIMES, supra note 399, at 167-73 (summarizing and analyzing these strategies); id. at 67-
85; 109-66 (illustrating these strategies). 
401 See id. at 173-75 (explaining why expert linguistic testimony is necessary to educate jurors). 
402 See, e.g., SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 396, at 53-94 (analyzing linguistic strategies in Miranda waivers and 
other aspects of interrogation); WELSH, WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON (2001) (summarizing much of the psychological literature on the impact of police 
interrogation practices and analyzing their mechanisms of operation). 
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None of these observations are meant to suggest that these police and prosecutor tactics are 
illegitimate (they may or may not be).  Rather, the points to be made are first, that suspect 
statements to criminal justice system actors necessarily expose the suspect to being mis-judged 
and mis-defined based on only partial and ambiguous evidence of his fundamental nature; and, 
second, that the criminal justice system creates particularly grave dangers that a suspect will lose 
control over the timing, degree, and content of self-revelation. In both respects, therefore, the 
suspect faces significant incursions upon his mental privacy.   
 D. Written and Internet Communications 
Do written and internet communications also involve mental privacy concerns given that 
such communications lack the paralinguistic cues found in face-to-face speech?  The answer is 
“yes,” though the nature, emphasis, and degrees of privacy may vary among these three media. 
 Writing differs from face-to-face oral communication (speech) in numerous ways.  Speech is 
usually time-bound (it occurs only at a particular moment in time), dynamic, transient, with all 
parties present and specific addressees in mind.403 Writing, at least before the advent of the 
computer, was and often still is space-bound (but it can be read at a variety of times), static, 
permanent, with great distance between speaker and recipient and often unknown addressees 
(e.g., those among the pool of readers who choose, though their identity is unbeknownst to the 
author, to pick up his book).404 Writing deprives recipients, in particular, of contextual signals to 
meaning, such as tone of voice, pitch, accent, body language, facial expressions, and eye 
contact.405 These cues allow for efforts immediately to be made to clarify ambiguities and fill in 
 
403 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 149. 
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405 See id. at 150. 
70
gaps.406 Moreover, conversation is negotiated in the sense that a speaker receiving a poor 
reception can quickly alter how and what he says. 407 Furthermore, apart from monologues and 
formal speeches, most oral communication is instantly interactive, a ready exchange among 
parties, an on-the-spot dialogue or even multi-logue.408 Additionally, these aspects of speech 
seem to encourage greater intimacy, where desired, than does writing, and paralinguistic clues 
can soften verbal blows, promote empathy, and encourage agreement, at least if the parties want 
to achieve these results.409 Writing, at least in laymen’s hands, by contrast can appear cold, 
mechanical, unyielding, and incomplete.410 Writing may also seem more easily subject to 
deception because of the great faith many of us have in our ability to judge others’ demeanor, to 
read their minds from their face and body.411 
Yet the human need to give meaning to communications, including inferences about the 
parties’ essential character, is so strong that readers will make quick, definite judgments on these 
matters though lacking the usual informational resources offered by speech.412 “The desire to 
form impressions of other people,” explained internet psychologist Patricia Wallace, relying 
upon the work of famed sociologist Erving Goffman, “and to manage our own impressions in 
 
406 See id. at 150-51. 
407 See WALTER ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY 104 (1982) (“To make yourself clear without gesture, without facial 
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MCEWAN, supra note 160, at 13.   
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social settings, are fundamental human characteristics….”413 If necessary, therefore, readers will 
rely on stereotypes, biases, and heuristics, globalizing from what little information they have, 
filling in gaps in their mind’s picture of another person on the flimsiest of evidence.414 A post-
World War II experiment by psychologist Solomon Asch illustrates the point.   Asch gave his 
experimental subjects a list of words describing a person, then asked the subjects to describe 
their image of this person’s character in ways other than those listed.415 He repeated this 
experiment numerous times, changing one word at a time.416 Asch discovered that changing a 
single word - - the word “warm” to “cold” - - changed the positive reactions to the person 
described to sharply negative ones, making him an unlikable, unpopular, disagreeable 
cheapskate.417 Readers also form impressions about character from a writer’s handwriting and 
its neatness or sloppiness, size, slant, and aesthetic appeal.418 The dangers of misjudging another 
person who communicates only by writing are large. 
 Yet, precisely because of these dangers, conventions have developed enabling writers to 
mimic much of the paralinguistic information conveyed by speech.  Spelling variations can 
indicate dialect (e.g., “color” for Americans, “colour” for the British) and accent, such as writing 
“sez,” rather than “says,” to indicate a non-standard accent.419 Punctuation can also indicate the 
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419 See id. at 116. 
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rhythm and color of speech.420 Question marks indicate a rising intonation at the end of a 
sentence, while exclamation points and italics suggest differing degrees of emphasis.421 
Quotation marks create the sense of verbatim speech, while letter repetition (“ye-e-es”) can 
indicate hesitation or confusion.422 In fiction or in informal non-fiction writing, colloquialisms, 
unfinished sentences, and long strings of uninterrupted clauses can also create the feel of live 
speech.423 Moreover, the mark of an excellent writer is often said to be his unique command of 
written stylistic features, giving him his own “personal voice.”424 Of course, no literal voice in 
the sense of sounds is involved, for writing is more about the eye than the ear.425 Yet the voice 
metaphor seems apt to describe an author’s writing style.  Although such a style may be most 
obvious in fiction (who cannot recognize a favorite author’s style?), unique style marks the best 
non-fiction writing too.426 Where the writer is someone whom the reader has heard speak before, 
the writer’s cadences may particularly come alive. I often write to my nephew, Jason.  When I 
point out an apparent hole in some argument he has made, he always begins his response with a 
single word:  “True.”  He then proceeds to make a different argument nevertheless intended to 
 
420 See id. at 118. 
421 See id. at 120. 
422 See id. at 119, 151. 
423 See id. at 138-39. 
424 See id. at 139; KARPF, supra note 243, at 203.  Explains Karpf: 
 Even the most resolutely visual and literate societies retain traces or residues of the oral 
tradition….The writing of James Joyce and Gerard Manley Hopkins, with its spoken rhythms, is 
another example of oral residue, as is the defence of the doctoral dissertation in some 
universities, in person and orally, and the way that children like to hear story cassettes over and 
over again. 
KARPF, supra note 243, at 203.  Karpf continues, however, to note that these are not merely residues, for “we use 
our voices in daily life just as much as our ancestors did,” though “we don’t recognize the fact.” Id. 
425 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 122-26 (noting, however, that there is some dispute on this point and that, in his 
view, both the eye and the ear play a role in learning to write).  
426 Who cannot tell the difference between, for example, conservative commentator Ann Coulter’s acerbic style and 
politically moderate law professor Cass Sunstein’s more measured style?  See, e.g., ANN COULTER, GODLESS: THE 
CHURCH OF LIBERALISM (2007); CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (2001).  
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demolish my position and fill the hole in his own. I laugh whenever he does this because it is a 
hallmark of his informal non-fiction writing and his speech.  Jason seems almost to be in the 
room with me, speaking face-to-face. 
 Writing is useless, of course, without reading, and the connection between the two often 
involves some kind of voice. As the example of my nephew Jason reveals, most of us hear a 
voice in our heads when we read.427 Interestingly, indeed, most people read silently at about the 
same pace as they would read out loud.428 Children likewise learn to read by reading aloud, and 
many forms of writing, from plays, to poetry, to political speeches, are meant to be orally 
performed in public.429 Even fluent readers facing new or different words might move their lips 
or sub-vocalize to become familiar with the sound of the new words.430 
None of these observations show that writing makes up entirely for the advantages of face-to-
face conversation.  But writing has some advantages of its own.  The very process of writing aids 
and clarifies thought, indeed, “Full meaning does not always exist prior to writing; often the 
process works in reverse.”431 Writing requires more planning and precision than speaking to 
avoid miscommunication precisely because there is no immediate opportunity to judge audience 
reaction and because the audience may be large, diverse, and its members and their 
preconceptions unknown to the author.432 Writing’s permanence allows repeated reading and 
close analysis of text in a way that the ephemeral words of a conversation cannot.433 The 
resulting debate can thus often be more informed and sophisticated. Writing also encourages 
wider debate than face-to-face oral communication because writing extends over time and space, 
 
427 Cf. THOMAS SZASZ, THE MEANING OF MIND: LANGUAGE, MORALITY, AND NEUROSCIENCE 1-20 (1996) (arguing 
that, for all practical purposes, the conscious mind is an internal conversation). 
428 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 124. 
429 See id. at 123-24. 
430 See id. at 123-26. 
431 See id. at 128. 
432 See id. at 127, 149-50. 
433 See id. at 150-51; KARPF, supra note 243, at 201-02. 
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reaching persons who would otherwise be locked out of discussion.434 Writing’s permanence 
aids memory, allowing ideas to have more lasting impact.435 For many of these reasons, some 
legal obligations can be created only in writing, and some religions center upon a written sacred 
text.436 Specialized forms of writing can also identify those sharing it as “in-group” members - - 
witness the special form of experimental reports in the field of psychology - - and can serve to 
build group solidarity and cohesion, as some commentators argue is true for lawyers using the 
unique style of legal writing.437 Writing can also be a way of self-understanding, helping you to 
clarify your feelings via internal dialogue, a function served by diaries, detailed calendar entries, 
and psychotherapeutic checklists of “flawed thoughts” that cause depression.438 Writing is, 
therefore, a mixed bag.  It is a less natural skill than speaking, is harder to do well, and lacks the 
warmth and immediacy of face-to-face voice communication.  But writing conventions, the need 
for pre-planning, and its aid in thinking may in some ways make its message more truly from 
“us.”  Anyone who has experienced the pain of having his or her writing critiqued understands 
how deeply our writing can seem to be a part of us, an extension of ourselves.439 
434 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 149-50 (writing extends over both time and space to often unknown audiences); 
see generally SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND RESHAPING 
OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007) (writing via the internet allows for such wide debate that bloggers, 
chatroom participants, and other internet users expressing political viewpoints should receive the same constitutional 
and statutory speech protections as we now extend to the press), 
435 See KARPF, supra note 243, at 201. 
436 See id. at 201 (noting print confers official legal status); CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 150-51 (similar, plus 
discussing the nature of sacred writings in religious traditions). 
437 See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 51-55 (1999) (discussing lawyers’ language and in-group cohesion); 
CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 150-51 (writing is usually more formal than speaking and provides society’s linguistic 
standard). 
438 See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 133, 136-37 (writing and reading enable clearer formulations of thoughts 
to ourselves and internal reflection on their meaning, and writings can even be directed to yourself as the audience, 
as is true with diaries, personal notes, and first drafts); MATTHEW MCKAY, ET. AL., THOUGHTS & FEELINGS: TAKING 
CONTROL OF YOUR MOODS AND YOUR LIFE (WORKBOOK) (2007). 
439 Cf. CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 128 (noting that writing “is not a merely merely mechanical task, a simple 
matter of putting speech down on paper.  It is an exploration in the use of the graphic potential of a language - - a 
creative process, an act of discovery.”). 
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Although much of this article has discussed the paralinguistic features of the spoken word, 
writing reminds us that the semantic content of the words themselves are important means by 
which we express aspects of our nature.  Linguistic sociologist Anne Karpf makes this point 
eloquently in de-bunking the public understanding of the work of UCLA psychology professor 
Albert Mehrabian.440 Mehrabian, created “an entire theory about human communication based 
on [experiments involving] three women saying one word, followed by two women reading eight 
words - - reading, not even spontaneously saying - - and two women listeners ‘imagining’ these 
words being spoken to someone else, and speculating about what feeling was being 
suppressed.”441 From these few, small-sample, highly flawed experiments, Mehrabian suggested, 
or at least those popularizing his work have suggested, that “only 7 percent of meaning in human 
communication comes from words, the rest from the voice and face.”442 But, insists Karpf, “It’s 
palpably absurd to suggest that in human conversation words play such an insignificant role, and 
the face such a major one: it clearly depends on who is talking to whom, when, where, and 
why.”443 This observation is even more apt for written communication, in which there is no face 
to observe.  Words can explicitly (“I’m sad”) and implicitly (from tone) convey both thoughts 
and feelings, whether the words are spoken or written.444 The written word is thus one very 
 
440 The most well-known of Mehrabian’s works on this subject are Albert Mehrabian & Susan R. Ferris, Inference of 
Attitudes from Nonverbal Communication in Two Channels, 31 J . CONSULTING PSYCH. 3 (1967); Albert Mehrabian 
& Morton Wiener, Decoding of Inconsistent Communications, 6. J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 113 (1967); 
ALBERT MEHRABIAN, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (1972). 
441 KARPF, supra note 243, at 210. 
442 Id. at 209. 
443 Id. at 210. 
444 Even writing can convey tone, albeit less fully than in speech.  For example a writer might describe a speaker as 
“dripping with sarcasm” or “sneering his words.” That writing can convey emotion should be no surprise to anyone 
who loves novels, from tragedies, to comedies, romances, adventure stories, or the magic of Harry Potter.  See also 
CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 152 (noting that “the relative permanence of writing makes it ideally suited for such 
functions as recording facts and communicating ideas” and that it increasingly serves social functions, such as the 
well-wishes on birthday cards, the granting of certain social privileges as occurs with the driver’s license, or the 
reporting of examination results that open or close doors to societal institutions and benefits.). 
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effective way to convey those portions of ourselves that we choose to disclose.445 Furthermore, 
precisely because of the heightened risks from ambiguity, the written word may expose us to a 
heightened risk of mis-definition.446 The damage done to our sense of identity can be magnified 
still more by the permanence and ease of wide distribution of writings, quickly expanding the 
circle of the community mis-judging us.447 For the state to compel a written communication 
from a potential or actual criminal suspect is thus as invasive of mental privacy as is compelling 
an oral communication, albeit in a subtly different way. 
 Nor does modern technological change undermine this conclusion. The phone creates 
distance between the speaker and listener in an oral communication but retains most of the other 
advantages of the spoken word.448 The computer makes the written word more easily deleted or 
altered but also makes preserving and disseminating it easier as well.449 The internet is perhaps 
the most significant technological tool, constituting, in the view of some commentators, an 
entirely new medium, neither true writing nor speaking but a combination of both and of some 
new features.450 
445 See supra text accompanying notes 192-211 (discussing the nature of privacy as including control over self-
disclosure). 
446 See supra text accompanying notes 192-211 (discussing the social significance of the risk of mis-definition). 
447 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338; at 149-51 (describing the ways that writing and speaking differ, including the 
former’s greater permanence and the distance it creates between writing and a perhaps diverse group of unknown 
readers). 
448 See id. at 152. 
449 See id. at 156. 
450 See id. at 157-58. Crystal explains: 
 Netspeak…is more than an aggregate of spoken and written features. Because it does things 
that the other mediums do not do, it has to be seen as a new species of communication.  It is 
more than just a hybrid of speech and writing, or the result of contact between two long-
standing mediums.  Electronic texts, of whatever kind, are simply not the same as other kinds of 
texts. They display fluidity, simultaneity (being available on an indefinite number of machines) 
and non-degradability in copying; they transcend the traditional limitations on textual 
dissemination; and they have permeable boundaries (because of the way one text may be 
integrated within others or display links to others). Several of these properties have 
consequences for language, and these combine with those associated with speech and writing to 
make electronic communication a genuine “new medium.” 
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For example, instant messages have the immediacy of face-to-face conversation but without 
face or voice.  E-mail is routinely deleted or altered yet uses the form of writing.451 E-mail 
creates its own challenges in conveying paralinguistic cues similar to the voice but has developed 
its own compensating conventions.  Thus using all capital letters means to shout (to “flame”), 
usually in anger;452 abbreviations like IMHO (“in my humble opinion”) and BTW (“by the way”) 
soften words that might otherwise seem imperious; and “emoticons,” such as smiley-faces, 
portray sadness, happiness, or confusion.453 Though in written form, however, most e-mails lack 
the pre-planning and care of the written article, book, report, or even the personal letter.454 
Conversations can also be more complex, as when multiple recipients join in “framing,” each 
responding only to certain portions of a document, with responses to responses to responses 
bouncing back-and-forth, creating a multi-voiced text.455 Hyper-links allow one document456 
instantly to become many, joining many communicators rapidly across time and space.457 The 
internet also creates its own unusual social dangers, such as the phenomenon of “group 
polarization.”458 People of similar minds gravitate to the same websites, list serves, and chat 
rooms.  But persons who hear only echoes of their own views tend to hold them in a more 
 
Id. at 158.  Even if Crystal is right, however, many of the features of this new medium (e.g., its easy and wide 
dissemination, its frequently involving less planning than in traditional writing) magnify the risks of ambiguity, 
miscommunication, and mis-definition. 
451 See id. at 156-57. 
452 See WALLACE, supra note 409, at 119. 
453 See id. at 18-19. 
454 See CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 157. 
455 See id. 
456 See id. 
457 See id. 
458 See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC. COM 65-77 (2001) (describing the group polarization phenomenon and how it 
plays out on the internet) [hereinafter REPUBLIC. COM]; CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE 17, 75, 92-98, 163, 186-88, 203-05, 215-16, 220-24 (2006) (similar, while also noting some 
circumstances under which group polarization can promote positive social goods). 
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extreme and intolerant fashion.  They become polarized.459 On the other hand, under certain 
conditions, the internet permits seemingly anonymous communication.460 This can encourage 
freer exchange of ideas and more extensive experimentation with identity because personal 
reprisals are impossible.461 But, for similar reasons, it can also encourage readier insults, more 
spontaneous outbursts, and greater cruelty of expression.462 In sum, the internet raises the risk of 
ill-planned and ambiguous text lacking contextual cues being disseminated to a wide and 
intolerant audience that will nevertheless readily make globalized judgments about the author of 
the communication.463 Compelled internet communications would, therefore, like compelled 
 
459 See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC. COM, supra note 458, at 65-77 (explaining why this occurs); WALLACE, supra note 
409, at 73-80. 
460 See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 458, at 208-09. 
461 See id. 
462 See WALLACE, supra note 409, at 126 (“It is easier to attack someone if they are out of sight and far away. We 
can’t see the injured and pained expression on their faces, and we feel safer and more immune to counterattack.”), 
239 (“People can act in very uninhibited ways when they think no one can find out who they really are.  In the 
environments that offer this, or at least offer some measure of it, people tend to let loose in both positive and 
negative ways.”).  
463 I am by no means suggesting that internet communications necessarily infringe on privacy.  Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that some internet users under certain conditions well short of complete anonymity are 
nevertheless more willing to engage in self-disclosure than they would in other media. See id. at 151.  But this is 
partly so because many of these communications are to discrete groups of trusted individuals with whom one has 
developed an on-line relationship, thus still being perceived as granting relative anonymity.  John Hopkins 
University technology professor Patricia Wallace put this point thus: 
You sit at a computer screen feeling relatively anonymous, distant, and physically safe and you 
sometimes feel closer to the people on the other side of your screen whom you have never seen 
than to the people in the next room.  You may reveal more about yourself to them, feel more 
attraction to them, and express more emotions - - even when all you have is an ASCII keyboard. 
At the keyboard, you can concentrate only on yourself, your words, and the feelings you want to 
convey.  You don’t have to worry about how you look, what you’re wearing, or those extra 
pounds you want to shed….You can also endlessly idealize those persons with whom you are 
interacting. Someone you know only as “Moonbeam” who has told you many intimate details of 
her life - - but not her name, address, or phone number - - is like a canvas with just a few 
iridescent brush strokes.  You can fill in the rest of that minimalist art work with your 
imagination. 
Id. at 151.  Greater self-disclosure on the net thus turns often on a perceived relative anonymity that partially shields 
you from the full consequences of others’ judging eyes, thus offering a degree of protection of the self, but the risk 
of mis-definition is still there and is greater still in the many situations where the writer has no privacy at all.  That 
risk is what triggers an entitlement to some measure of privacy-recognition.  
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oral and written ones, wound personal identity, invading mental privacy in deeply disturbing 
ways.   
IV. Compulsion 
The risk of mis-definition by others when we lose control over expressive self-revelation is 
an incomplete explanation, however, for what is distinct about the privilege against self-
incrimination.  Suppose that A is talking to his friend B in the privacy of A’s home.  
Unbeknownst to either person, the police have planted a bug in A’s living room, a bug installed 
without probable cause or a warrant.  The bug records A confessing a crime to B, without any 
prompting by B, who is thoroughly surprised.  A’s verbal confession of his guilt is meant to be 
private in the sense of being something shared only with B.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
this privacy, and the confession, being overheard only because of the illegally-implanted bug, 
will be suppressed at trial.464 But neither the state, nor, in this example, anyone else compelled A
to reveal what was on A’s mind.  Accordingly, although the police did violate one constitutional 
provision, they did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s protections.465 
The privilege thus protects only against the compelled linguistic expression of thoughts or 
feelings.  Of course, compelled expression may conceivably violate both the privilege and the 
Fourth Amendment, at least if, as at least one commentator has argued, the Fourth Amendment’s 
privacy protections extend to confessions, thus requiring “interrogation warrants.”466 This 
position is, however, one that the United States Supreme Court has never accepted.467 Thus, if 
 
464 See Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to eavesdropping 
if done without the consent of any of the parties to the conversation); TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note, 2 at 
515-21 (analyzing Berger and its progency). 
465 See TASLITZ & PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 683-84, 699-703 (noting that there is no Fifth Amendment 
violation without compulsion). 
466 See Russell D. Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867 (2005). 
467 See id. at 1879-93. 
 
80
the police compelled someone into confessing in a public place, that would violate the privilege 
but, under current doctrine, not the Fourth Amendment.468 Compulsion, and not just by anyone 
but by the state, is thus one key feature distinguishing the Fifth from the Fourth Amendment’s 
privacy protections.469 
But what is “compulsion,” and how can we detect its presence or absence?  Those are in fact 
not questions that I plan to answer here, and many other scholars have articulated their own 
responses.470 What matters for my purposes is understanding why the Fifth Amendment requires 
compulsion, for that is part of accomplishing my overriding task of justifying the Fifth 
Amendment privilege’s existence in the first place. Why the Amendment requires compulsion 
can indeed be answered without knowing precisely how its presence can be determined in any 
individual case. There are three reasons:  first, compelled expression involves the state in 
actively changing the very thoughts and feelings that persons seek to keep private; second, 
though relatedly, the words we speak or write shape our character; and third, state-compelled 
confessions are degradation ceremonies that violate the proper boundaries between the state and 
the individual in a decent, liberal society.  State-compelled expression of thought and feeling, in 
 
468 This conclusion follows directly from the Court’s theory that, under the “assumption of risk” doctrine, there is no 
privacy in a public place; certainly not privacy protection against observation of what one says or does in public.  
See Andrew E. Tasltiz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human 
Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.S 125, 134-43 (2002).  Of course, if the police used physical force or its threat to 
compel the public confession, then, even in this hypothetical, the Fourth Amendment might also be implicated.  See 
TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 304-14. 
469 See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 683-84, 699-703.  I thus disagree with Covey’s assertion that 
the “Self-Incrimination Clause is not well-suited to protect individual privacy,” Covey, supra note 466, at 1868, 
though he is right that that Clause has not currently been interpreted to serve that function.  See id. Moreover, Covey 
also states that several constitutional provisions, including the Self-Incrimination Clause, “[i]n theory…could have 
been the basis for an expansive constitutional interrogation doctrine that effectively protected individual privacy.” 
Id. Here I seek to articulate just such a theory. 
470 The most interesting recent such effort is Mark Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a 
Worktable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2006) (arguing for defining 
compulsion as a state alteration of a person’s status quo by removing any of the rights assumed in his “baseline” set 
of circumstances existing just before government intervention).  I do, however, plan to resolve some very specific 
privilege doctrine conundrums in the in-progress companion piece to this article.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Miranda 
and Metaphor: The Role of Counsel Under the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (unpublished draft manuscript 
2007). 
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at least these three respects, thus undermines the independence and uniqueness of human 
personality as well as exposing us to mis-definition by others.  Once again, under the privilege, 
“[i]t is what a defendant may do with his lips - - what may issue from his mouth - - that is 
considered worthy of special protection.”471 
A. Expression Changes Thoughts and Feelings 
The commonsense notion that expression is only about representing the information 
residing in our minds is wrong.  The very act of speaking or writing also changes the very 
thoughts and feelings that we seek to express.  Expression is thus usually, though not always, a 
creative act.472 
Dictionaries and custom give individual words their meaning.473 But each of us must choose 
which words to speak, in what order and emphasis, with what purpose and tone.474 We seek to 
convey complex concepts and emotions, and, in doing so, we may find that our words fail us, for 
the words spoken then themselves become subject to our thoughts.475 Once a person speaks, her 
words may reveal to her the fuzziness with which she holds her ideas or even the absence of any 
coherent idea whatsoever when she initially thought that she had some great insight.476 Speaking 
aloud may draw her attention to the ambiguity, or a confused listener may do so.477 She must 
 
471 PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 29 (2000). 
472 See TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 2-6 (2006) (noting also that “[l]anguage is not a vessel for 
ideas; it also constitutes their very fabric.”). 
473 See TIERSMA, supra note 437, at 115-20 (analyzing the roles of dictionaries and custom in defining words as they 
are generally used and in the specialized context of the law). 
474 See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 137-39 (making similar point in the context of writing). 
475 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 3, 5 (noting that “language, once in existence, becomes a subject of thought 
itself.”). 
476 See id. at 6 (making this point as to both the spoken and written word); CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 127 
(emphasizing the value of rewriting as part of a process of clarifying and correcting thoughts). 
477 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 2 (discussing some of the advantages of speaking aloud), 7-9 (analyzing how 
we fill in “expressive gaps,” that is, how we can find difficulty searching for the words to express our nascent 
thoughts and feelings, difficulty that can reveal to us the need to clarify or modify our understanding of the matter 
involved). 
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then abandon or refine the thought or find another in its place.478 This process may begin with 
internal self-conversation, but it eventually requires some utterance, whether to one’s self or to 
an imagined or real audience.  New words are required.479 
Words can also help us to understand that which silence only confounds. We may feel grief 
but cannot fully know its meaning for our lives, its portents for the future, or how to cope with it 
until we speak it aloud or share it with others.480 
Writers may be acutely aware of these processes.  Words put down on paper can reveal gaps 
(to author and reader) in previously inchoate arguments or reveal gaps in what at first seemed to 
be airtight syllogisms.481 Typing or handwriting a particular word may reveal its ambiguity or its 
status as a poor choice to convey a point, requiring the author to wrestle seriously with just what 
is his point.482 The act of writing may reveal the poverty of a position or send an intellectual 
inquiry or emotional journey into new, unexpected directions.483 The words we write can also 
reveal the incompleteness in our thoughts and feelings or their expression, sending us on a quest 
 
478 See id. at 7-9. 
479 See id. at 8-13. 
480 See id. at 5 (Without language we would still feel grief, but in the absence of tears, gestures, or words we would 
not be able to express that grief, even to ourselves, and our inability to comprehend it.”).  Physical expression alone 
is never enough, for, for example, in order fully to “see” an inspiration, to “know its rational contours,” we “have to 
put it in language.  Otherwise the answer will remain an intuition.” Id. Anyone who has seen a therapist, confided in 
a friend, kept a diary, or struggled with finding just the “right word” to put down on paper intuitively understands 
the insight that even internal self-conversations in words are different in kind from the impact of externally 
expressing those words. Furthermore, there are some conscious thoughts that we simply do not even entertain until 
someone asks us to express them, such as when a friend poses a novel question about your motivations for a certain 
action or when a professor asks you to write a paper on a subject of whose existence you were previously unaware. 
481 See id. at 7-9 (analyzing “expressive gaps”). 
482 See id. at 2 (noting that a person trying to write down even a thought previously spoken aloud may find at first 
that it is “difficult to reproduce the clarity that he thought he had already achieved.”), 3 (“Even the choice of writing 
instrument seems to make a difference: he finds that pen and paper are often the best for the most difficult passages; 
the cramped nature of the technique goes well with the density of the thought.”). 
483 See id. at 3 (noting, concerning the writing process, that, “The choice of certain words, phrases and images 
inevitably triggers new trains of thought that lead in new directions that are at once more concrete and specific than 
purely mental images, and more complex and literary than the spoken language in which he has already rehearsed 
them.”); CRYSTAL, supra note 338, at 127 (analyzing the writing process). 
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to fill the gaps.484 A thought is an embryonic word, a word an infant thought.485 British legal 
philosopher Timothy Macklem summarized these points:   
When we put our thoughts and feelings into words and phrases, and so turn 
them into spoken or written language, whether for our own benefit or for the 
benefit of some other, when we sketch our response to a scene before us and 
so turn that response into line and shading, when we whistle or when we hum, 
we are necessarily, if modestly, creative. We start to say something, as an 
attempt to capture some aspect of what we think or feel, and as we say it our 
speech gains a suggestive momentum of its own, so that what begins as a 
limited perspective upon a richer thought soon acquires a life that outstrips the 
bounds of the original thought, inspiring new thoughts that depart from the 
original in ways that were neither foreseen nor foreseeable in advance.486 
Words have inherent value too.  Merely choosing to speak to another can be a heartening 
victory for a shy man.  A writer recognizing that he has chosen the perfect word to capture a 
thought rejoices.  In both instances, the pleasure comes from the talking or the writing 
independently from the content of the words chosen.487 
Even our memory is partly constituted by our words.488 Memories are not photographs of 
events but reconstructions of them.489 Our biases, self-interest, intervening life experiences, and 
myriad other factors combine to create our memories.490 Ample research shows that what we say 
can alter this creative process.491 For example, an eyewitness describing an assailant becomes 
more likely to identify someone from a lineup as the offender if he matches that description than 
would be the case if the witness were asked to identify the true offender’s face when the witness 
 
484 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 3, 7-11. 
485 See id. at 14 (noting that “thoughts are like partly formed embryos” until expressed). 
486 Id. at 6. 
487 Cf. id. at 13-14 n. 13 (“Verbal language is also intrinsically valuable, partly on aesthetic grounds (language can 
have distinctive aesthetic appeals, musicality for example) and partly because it is constitutive of certain goods and 
activities (such as poetry, wordplay, Scrabble, crosswords, spelling bees).”). 
488 See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 97, at 19 (“Memory itself is an assertion, a self-report, which we play 
an active role in constructing.”). 
489 See id. at 19-20. 
490 See TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 869-70 (discussing the nature of human memory as a 
constructive process and problems of encoding, storage, and retrieval). 
491 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 36-
38 (2006). 
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had given no description at all.492 There is also evidence that confessing can itself alter the 
confessor’s recollection of events.493 
Words can also constitute parts of our social word. Entreaties, promises, denials, admissions 
consist of words or their equivalent.494 But the very act of bringing these social facts into 
existence changes the social world we inhabit and our feelings about it.495 One to whom a 
promise is made on an important matter, for example, often expects its fulfillment and plans for 
the future accordingly, a matter of grave consequence if the promise-maker is a police officer, 
the promise-taker a suspect.496 
More broadly, words alter our relationships with others. 497 Lengthy conversations involving 
self-disclosure create an intimacy between former acquaintances, who now slowly mutate into 
friends.498 Words of comfort turn a distant co-worker into a respected colleague, words of 
 
492 See id. at 31-35. 
493 See, e.g., Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Mental Retardation, Competency to Waive Miranda Rights, 
and False Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 163-170-72 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed. 
2004) [hereinafter CONFESSION AND ENTRAPMENT] (reviewing research suggesting that the mentally retarded are 
highly suggestible to police interrogation, meaning that they accept as true the words they come to recite as a result 
of leading questions, thus raising the risk of false confessions); Alison D. Redlich, The Police Interrogation of 
Children and Adolescents, in CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT, supra at 107, 115-16 (discussing research on 
“imagination inflation,” in which participants “are asked to systematically imagine false events,” as a consequence 
of which they “become more confident that the event occurred” and further noting that, “In several cases of false 
confession, similar techniques (e.g., asking suspects to make up how they would have committed the crime) have 
been used and highly criticized as the main contributing factor to wrongful arrests or convictions….”). 
494 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 13-14 n. 13 (noting words are constitutive of some practices); JOHN SEARLE,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 1-70, 95-145 (1995) (arguing that at least some facts cannot exist without 
the human institution of language). 
495 See SEARLE, supra note 494, at 1-70, 95-145 (illustrating this point). 
496 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES 8-9 (2005) (analyzing promissory reliance 
generally); WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER 
DICKERSON 204-09 (2001) (arguing that police promises made to obtain confessions induce such strong suspect 
reliance as to risk even an innocent person’s confessing). 
497 See, e.g., CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 385, at 42-46 (explaining how language practices in mediation can, at 
their best restore civility and promote agreement). 
498 Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 468, at 152 (“Complete revelation of ourselves requires time and trust 
and is reserved only for our most intimate relationships.”); cf. MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 55 (“[A] person’s 
character and commitments are not simply given, but are artefacts that develop over time, sometimes through an 
exchange with others (which isolation prevents), and sometimes through seclusion from them (which isolation 
defines and secures).”). 
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advice turn a teacher into a mentor.499 Words can turn relationships unpleasant too.  An angry 
tirade by a lover can break bonds of trust, by a boss can intimidate, just as words of boasting can 
sometimes raise the speaker’s status at the expense of the listener’s.500 
A “room of one’s own,”501 the isolated privacy of one’s mind, is necessary to fostering 
creativity and distinctiveness, for, without fear of scrutiny or knowledge of all social 
expectations, we can let our mind and heart wander where they will.502 But a life of endless 
isolation is impoverished, missing others’ perspectives, new information, and the bonds to other 
individuals, families, groups, institutions, and nations that combine to become important parts of 
the unique persons we are.503 When the state plays too active and large a role in interfering with 
our choices about what to reveal, when, how, and why through our words, they alter the very 
thoughts and feelings that make us who we are.504 Each individual and group is always to some 
extent molded by the law and by other acts of the state.505 But when the state actively intervenes 
on a very personal level to prompt us to speak, it invades and commandeers our personalities in a 
 
499 Cf. MICROSOFT ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTIONARY 903 (2001) (defining a mentor as “somebody, usually older and 
more experienced, who provides advice and support to, and watches over and fosters the progress of, a younger, less 
experienced person”). 
500 See, e.g., TANNEN, 9 TO 5, supra note 387, at 185-86, 204-41 (analyzing jockeying for status on the job). 
501 See VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 160 (1967) (creating the image of a room of one’s own as 
necessary to independence of thought, further declaring, “five hundred a year stands for the power to 
contemplate…a lock on the door means the power to think for oneself.”). 
502 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 36. 
503 See id. at 35 (describing one privacy theory in which “privacy is a matter of restricting the potential range of 
one’s human contacts, so as to form deeper connections with a more limited number of people, people such as 
spouses, lovers, and children”); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992) (originating this 
theory of privacy as intimacy); SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 458, at 75-77 (stressing the importance of 
diverse relationships to achieving new perspectives). 
504 See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson 
v. Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2002) [hereinafter Feminist Fourth Amendment] (summarizing 
this argument, which is based on the work of Kevin Crotty and Philosopher Michael Foucault); KEVIN M. CROTTY,
LAW’S INTERIOR: LEGAL AND LITERARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE SELF 100-02 (2001) (originating this argument).  
Crotty applies Foucault’s theory to the specific context of police interrogation.  See id. Although Jurgen Habermas 
has a more positive view of the social value of confession than does Foucault, both thinkers recognize that the “self” 
can be significantly shaped by the state, and both their theories recognize that compelled confessions “are powerful 
ways to undermine the individual’s autonomy and uniqueness that are purported to be central to the modern liberal 
state.” Taslitz, Feminist Fourth Amendment, supra, at 17. 
505 See Taslitz, Feminist Fourth Amendment, supra note 504, at 16. 
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way that makes that speech and what it says about who we are far less than it otherwise would 
have been a matter truly of our own choice.506 
B. Words Shape Character 
If thoughts and feelings are components of who we are, their combination and evolution 
over time help to constitute our character, our more enduring ways of experiencing and acting 
upon the world.507 The sum of who we are is, however, more than the combination of these 
parts, for together we turn them into a unique, defining, individual life story, a tale that is us.508 
A person who is thus ten years old today will, in twenty years, have different attitudes, 
beliefs, goals, and desires. He may have fewer organs, such as the removal of his gall bladder, 
may be fatter or thinner, more or less energetic. Even at the molecular level, the precise 
molecules constituting his body will have changed.  Yet he and others will still think of him as 
the same person, as “Hank Jones” and not suddenly “Clay Smith.”509 
What explains this sense of individual continuity is the narrative coherence of human lives.  
We each tell ourselves stories that link together the different phases of our lives.510 Our sense of 
self largely consists of these stories.511 “Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and 
hating, are guided by narrative plots.”512 Narratives, of course, move through time, having a 
beginning, a middle, and an end.513 One cannot, therefore, be a person at a single moment in 
 
506 See id. at 16-17. 
507 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 169, at 7-14. 
508 See id. 14-30. 
509 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 131-42 (2001) 
(making similar point). 
510 See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 97, at 34-36. 
511 See id.; JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 63-89 (2002) (discussing the narrative 
creation of the self). 
512 Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology, in NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE 
STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed. 1986). 
513 See RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 137; accord Bruner, supra note 511, at 15 (“[W]e know that narrative in all 
its forums is a dialectic between what was expected and what came to pass.”). 
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time.514 To be a person is to be the combination of what you were, are, and will be.515 The 
narrative nature of personhood does not make it a fiction. The narrative is who you are.516 
Every act of expression affects each person’s life story.  What we say or not, how we say it 
or instead convey silence, when, and to whom is a choice about how each of us sees ourselves 
and wants others to see us.517 Though sometimes made quickly, we do not make these choices 
lightly.  In part, we are what we do, and words are a form of action.518 If we lie, that may 
reinforce our self-image as a liar or undermine our image as a truthteller. Even if we start out as 
generally truthful, repeated lies makes us more comfortable with deceit until it becomes integral 
to our character.519 If we challenge authority, that makes us defiant.  Every word uttered or not 
is another chapter in our story, an expressive choice that makes us, in some significant way, the 
authors of our lives. These choices, explains one legal theorist: 
become creative if and when they are, prospectively or retrospectively, 
made part of the story of a life, where the idea of a story is understood, not 
simply as a factual record, but as the narrative of a personal encounter with 
value, the development, recollection, and recounting of which has become a 
source of value in its own right.  People typically aspire to be at least part 
authors of their own lives, and the metaphor of authorship is an apt one, not 
because people often function creatively in making the decisions that govern 
the shape and direction of their lives, but also because in doing so they are 
very often conscious of the narrative implications of their decisions, 
sufficiently so as to take those implications to be elements of great weight in 
 
514 See RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 137. 
515 Id. 
516 See id. 
517 Macklem thus explains the importance of freedom of expression: 
Freedom entails choice, choice shapes character, and character helps to shape the role of 
incommensurable values in human well-being, for it establishes which values are in our interest 
and which are not, in the face of the manifold values we otherwise have reason to pursue. 
MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 19-20. 
518 See Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 436-37 (noting that what we consistently do shapes our thoughts, 
feelings, and character even down to the subconscious level); supra notes 398-407 (explaining that some actions and 
institutions consist of the words we speak). 
519 Cf. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 88, at 394-403, 436-37 (explaining similar concept in the context of 
self-deceit). 
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the assessment of their reasons for action. They decide the course of their 
life at any given moment in much the same way that authors do with respect 
to fictional lives, so as to develop the character, style, and plot of their 
particular life story.520 
To be compelled to speak certain sorts of words at a certain time, in a certain setting is to lose 
control over your own life’s tale in a profound way, to make you something you were not and 
did not originally choose to be.  You become the state’s creature more than your own.  You cease 
to write the tale that is you, passing authorship to your interrogators.  You are re-defined.521 
C. Confession as a Degradation Ceremony 
One argument often made in favor of interrogation by the state is that confession is good 
for the soul.522 The police are doing little more than appealing to conscience, and to confess 
because one’s conscience is pricked is to cleanse the soul, a rational, free choice and the first step 
on the road to redemption.523 
But what is a conscience?  A conscience is a personal commitment to a set of reasons meant 
to be given special weight in guiding our actions.524 Because a conscience involves 
commitment, it cannot be readily tossed aside or altered.525 Moreover, were it to change too 
 
520 MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 30. 
521 See supra notes 504-05 and accompanying text. 
522 Justice Scalia forcefully stated this position: 
[I]t is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard an honest confession 
as a mistake. While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for the wrongdoer 
to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves.  Not only for society, but for the 
wrongdoer himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently desirable because it 
advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation….We should, then, rejoice at the “poor 
fool” who has made [an honest confession]; and we should regret the attempted retraction of 
that good act rather than seek to facilitate and encourage it. To design our laws on premises 
contrary to these is to abandon belief in either personal responsibility or the moral claim of just 
government to obedience. 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
523 See id. 
524 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 101-02. 
525 See id. On the nature of commitment, see RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 91-102; R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 50 (2001). 
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rapidly, it would fail to give us the stability and continuity in behavior necessary to achieving 
certain longer-term life goals, including the person we wish to be in the future.526 The dictates of 
conscience stem from a combination of our upbringing, close personal attachments, long-term 
goals, and accumulated rational choices about our live’s direction.527 Conscience reminds us, in 
the face of more tempting and immediate reasons, of our longer and deeper goals.528 Yet 
conscience must nevertheless be subject to slow change and periodic re-evaluation, to making 
informed choices about its wisdom and content.529 Otherwise, it is no longer our commitments 
but the commitments of others, or of some old and temporally-isolated version of ourselves, that 
governs our actions.530 Moreover, we must be alert to when our conscience degenerates into a 
mere concern for the image of who we are rather than the reality or becomes a source of bias or 
empty standards.531 Nor is our conscience always our best guide, for it may in some situations 
conflict with other compelling reasons for action or reveal the inadequacy or incompleteness of 
the code our conscience embodies in addressing the strange or the extreme.532 Above all, 
therefore, conscience must be of our own making, and we do not truly act from conscience 
 
526 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 103; RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 96,100. 
527 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 98-102 (describing the sources of conscience in both experience and reason). 
528 See id. at 112.  Macklem put it this way: 
We call upon conscience only in cases of moral permission, where we seek to imagine the future 
without much guidance from the past, and further seek to structure and be true to the demands 
of that future, and make our choice among options as to its direction and course, by reference to 
an image of ourselves as the person we have thereby committed ourselves to becoming. 
Id. 
529 Cf. RUBENFELD, supra note 509, at 96-100 (making similar point in connection with the cognate concept of 
commitments). 
530 Cf .id. (again making similar point in the context of the cognate concept of commitments); see MACKLEM, supra 
note 472, at 98 (“conscience is a special kind of rational commitment”). 
531 See MACKLEM, supra note 472, at 114. 
532 See id. 108-10, 112-13.  Adds Macklem, “Conscience [sometimes]…calls upon us to attend to our attachments as 
a matter of duty, when there may be good reason to do otherwise.  By attending to the claims of conscience in such a 
situation we may honour our self-image at the expense of our obligations to others….” Id. at 113. 
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unless it is we who instigate action.533 Where others seek to appeal to our conscience, 
particularly in ways designed to manipulate us for their own ends, they can injure our 
conscience, turning its virtue into vice.534 
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s story of the “stolen ribbon” in book 2 of his Confessions 
illustrates the point.535 Rousseau and a young kitchen maid had once been servants in the home 
of Madame de Vercellis.  Upon her death, Rousseau stole one of her ribbons to give to the 
kitchen maid as a sign of affection.  The executor of the estate, Comte de la Roque, discovered 
the ribbon missing, it being found among Rousseau’s things.  Comte de la Roque publicly 
summoned Rousseau to explain how the ribbon came into his possession.  Rousseau accused 
Marion, the very kitchen maid who was the object of Rousseau’s affection, of being the thief, 
insisting it was she who gave the ribbon to him. When she denied the charge, Comte de la Roque 
fired them both, uncertain of the truth, in the hope that the conscience of the guilty one would 
avenge the plight of the innocent.  Rousseau’s conscience did plague him, but it did not prod him 
to tell the truth at the time, and it is partly this that tortures him.  “She was present in my 
thoughts; I excused myself on the first object that came to hand,”536 wrote Rousseau.  “I accused 
her,” he continued, “of having done what I wanted to do and of having given me the ribbon since 
 
533 See id. at 108 (“Accumulated wisdom only becomes a matter of conscience when we commit ourselves to it 
personally, so as to make adherence to that wisdom part of our self-understanding….”).  Macklem further notes, 
therefore, that “when conscience reminds us to be moral it is not only for the sake of the reasons that conscience 
embodies, but for the sake of the self-image and self-respect that adherence to the claims of our conscience gives 
rise to.”  Id. 
534 Cf. id. at 118 (“We enjoy freedom of conscience as and when we develop our conscience in such as way as to 
make the exercise of freedom distinctively our own…,” an injunction that would seem to be inconsistent with 
individual conscience becoming a mere tool for others to achieve their own goals rather than a way for the 
conscience-holder to become the person that he, in making his own choices about how to live his life, truly wants to 
be); PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 16 (2000) (arguing that 
the privilege against self-incrimination was partly historically rooted in the beliefs that matters of conscience need 
not be spoken if that can lead to serious condemnation of the content of the conscience). 
535 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSSEAU, CONFESSIONS (transl. 1962); BROOKS, supra note 534, at 19-231 (articulating 
similar reading of Rousseau’s episode of the “stolen ribbon”). 
536 ROUSSEAU, supra note 535, at 23. 
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it was my intention to give it to her.”537 Nor did Rousseau confess his guilt to anyone, not even 
to family or friends, until many years later, when writing the Confessions.538 Rousseau further 
bemoaned the way that de la Roque’s actions had blocked Rousseau’s conscience from operating 
as it should.  One commentator summed up Rousseau’s reasoning: 
Thus we have a problem in desire which, thwarted in its intent, gives way to 
its apparent opposite, the wish to punish. If only his accusers had given him 
time to repent, and the opportunity to confess privately, he would have told 
the truth. But public exposure, the risk of being publicly declared a thief and 
a liar, is too strong for him to perform on the spot the confession he wants to 
make - - and now makes so many years later.539 
Conscience needs time and a modicum of privacy to do its work rightly.  The public nature of 
the accusation and the implicit threat of penalties make Rousseau into just what he feared the 
truth would reveal: an informant, a liar, a disloyal would-be lover, a selfish hypocrite motivated 
by fear rather than courage, vice rather than virtue.  Rousseau was, of course, already a thief, but 
public questioning by those more powerful than he, followed by an appeal to conscience, made 
him into something far worse.  If we are, to a large extent, what we do, Rousseau’s later guilt 
pangs did little to erase the stain from his cowardly actions, a character wounded by the 
compulsion to make him confess.  It is hard to see how modern interrogation by the police is any 
better on this score.  Although the suspect is alone with the police,540 that is not the sort of 
privacy that conscience requires, for the police are themselves a symbol and arm of the public, 
charged with doing its will.541 A confession under such circumstances is not a private revelation 
 
537 Id. 
538 See BROOKS, supra note 534, at 19-21. 
539 Id. at 20. 
540 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-52. 
541 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political 
Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.S 221, 291-94 (2003); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 93 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 47-50 (2003); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 73-83 (2006). 
92
by a criminal to the one he has wronged but an effort to degrade the subject’s will to the service 
of his tormentors.542 
Even had Rousseau told the truth, his interrogation would still have been a degradation 
ceremony.  As the Court detailed, albeit in other words, in Miranda, the very purpose of 
interrogation is to degrade the suspect, to make him less, his questioners more.543 If autonomy is 
central to making us the author of our own stories, the interrogator’s goal is to compromise that 
autonomy, writing the next chapter for us.  Placed in a situation where the suspect is dependent 
upon his interrogators, then asked to confess, his motives for speaking will be different from the 
sincere penitent.  Even if sincerity is part of what drives the interrogatee, the risk of his motives 
being “aberrant,”544 of speaking in significant part out of hopelessness, confusion, or fear, is 
great.545 Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,546 albeit writing about the due 
process clause, took this argument to its extreme: 
It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any shameful or guilty 
act. Even a “voluntary confession” is not likely to be the product of the 
same motives with which one may volunteer information that does not 
incriminate or concern him.  The term “voluntary confession” does not 
mean voluntary in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one’s 
soul of a sense of guilt.  “Voluntary confessions” in criminal law are the 
product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed from a 
belief that further denial is useless and perhaps prejudicial. To speak of any 
confessions of crime made after arrest as being “voluntary” or “uncoerced” 
is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional. 
 
A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty 
person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser.  The Court 
bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner 
for thirty-six hours is “inherently coercive.”  Of course it is.  And so is 
 
542 Cf. Miranda 384 U.S. at 457-58. 
543 See id. at 457-59. 
544 See BROOKS, supra note 534, at 25. 
545 Id. at 24. 
546 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
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custody and detention for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and 
so is detention.547 
Jackson here dissents from the majority’s finding of coercion, arguing that the legal concept 
tolerates much more pressure than does the commonsense concept.548 But the commonsense 
concept of “coercion” that he so aptly describes is much akin to the Miranda Court’s definition 
of “compulsion,” using similar reasoning to conclude that custodial interrogation, absent 
warnings and the opportunity to consult with counsel, was “inherently compelling.”549 
Confession has long been the “queen of proofs” in our culture.550 Police seek confessions 
even when there is ample independent evidence of guilt.551 Words, in our culture, perhaps all 
cultures, have power.552 They can be sacred or profane, rousing or soothing.  But, whatever they 
are, we need them.  The interrogation ritual seeks to compel the suspect to part with his words, 
both because they can be a window into his soul and because, by confessing, he is marked with a 
status as a lesser being.553 To be humiliated or shamed is to be changed.  “To participate in a 
 
547 Id. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
548 See id. 
549 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461-67. For an analysis of the difference between prevailing views of “coercion” under 
the due process clauses and “compulsion” under the Fifth Amendment, see TASLITZ, PARIS, & HERBERT, supra note 
2, at 699-702. 
550 See BROOKS, supra note 534, at 9. 
551 See ABA, ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 491, at 11-12 (noting risks of false confessions even where this is 
independent evidence); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED 40-41  
(2006) (similar); BROOKS, supra note 534, at 4 (“Western culture, most strikingly since the Romantic era to our day, 
has made confessional speech a prime mark of authenticity….”), 9 (“Confession has for centuries been regarded as 
the ‘queen of proofs’ in the law: it is a statement from the lips of the person who should know best.”). 
552 See CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 385, at 204. 
553 See BROOKS, supra note 534, at 5 (“If we have been taught that confession, the self-examination and the 
inwardness that confession both reflects and maybe creates, is essential to our psychic and moral health and our very 
definition as unique individuals, are we sure that we want the law to be able to use the confessional gesture so freely 
as it does?”)  Brooks continues   
If contemporary culture appears to insist on a generalized transparency, in which each of us is 
fully open to all others without dissimulation, doesn’t the generalized confessional requirement 
also constitute a tyranny, a policing of the very privacy that selfhood requires?  And if 
confession implies a penitential state that may involve disgrace, even abjection, doesn’t it often 
appear a violation of human dignity? 
Id. at 9. 
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ritual that is personally repugnant”554 is indecent, a hallmark of an illiberal, “uncivilized” 
society.555 To be the sort of person who bows in subjection to the state is to abandon the defiant 
character that a republic requires.556 When it is the state doing the humiliating, it invades the 
“private” in a very important way, for it erodes the boundaries of personhood to let in the power 
of the state.557 It is the state’s act of compelling words that does this damage to the self, a re-
definition and normalizing of the unique self.558 Yet, even when these words include “factual 
truth,” they provide only a partial perspective on the speaker’s full and complex nature, and they 
once again subject the speaker to mis-definition by the crowd.559 
None of these comments are made to suggest that interrogations should never be permitted, 
nor even that state compulsion must flatly be barred.  There are always competing, often 
weightier, interests, and, no matter the express language of the Fifth Amendment, the Court 
frequently and properly balances the values served by the privilege against competing needs.560 
Nor do I mean to glorify offenders, many of whom are less than admirable human beings, some 
of whom commit truly heinous crimes, and the bulk of whom probably merit some punishment. 
But state compelled revelation of our thoughts and feelings in words does do violence to the soul 
and to the political culture that permits it. Even if such violence is sometimes necessary, it should 
be avoided, or at least minimized, whenever possible, and that is the reason for being for the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination’s compulsion requirement.   
V. Conclusion 
554 See HAIG BOSMAJIAN, THE FREEDOM NOT TO SPEAK 196 (1999). 
555 See id. at 197. 
556 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People: The Criminal Procedure Implications of a Scatalogical 
Term, 75 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1, 57-65 (forthcoming 2007) (draft manuscript) (discussing the Jeffersonian theory 
of a “spirited” republican people). 
557 See CROTTY, supra note 504, at 100-02. 
558 See supra text accompanying notes 192-207. 
559 See supra text accompanying notes 171-207. 
560 See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 2, at 752-54, 798, 806-12, 817-20. 
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The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, I have argued here, is best 
understood as being central to promoting the human voice.  In this article, I have centered on one 
of the two sorts of voices that matter - - the literal voice - - leaving discussion of the 
metaphorical voice for another day.  Only once the metaphorical voice is more fully explained 
will I be ready to resolve many of the conundrums raised by the privilege.561 Nevertheless, this 
article has, I hope, laid the first brick in the foundation.  Preventing compelled speech via the 
literal voice protects against the distortion of human character caused by loss of control over our 
own words and protects the reluctant speaker from thereby being mis-defined by his audience.  
To lose control over self-definition is a drastic interference with human autonomy and a grave 
insult to human worth.  The privilege is not so much about the privacy of our thoughts as of our 
words and, in ways too often unappreciated, our words define our very nature. 
 
561 I therefore recognize that I have not yet expressly explained how producing documents can (or should be) 
protected by the privilege or why immunity, guilty pleas, and other seeming forms of compelled words can be 
squared with the privilege.  Once it is recognized, however, that the privilege is not absolute but is subject to 
balancing, each of these instances can be understood as judgments that countervailing needs outweighed those 
served by the privilege. Still, the argument here suggests that such balancing in favor of the state should be rare, and 
my companion piece’s analysis of the metaphorical voice will complete the tools needed for critiquing current law 
on these and other matters in a more fine-grained way. 
